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Abstract 
In a world where emerging markets are increasingly driving the world’s economic growth, 
and an increasing part of the world’s energy supply comes from politically unstable or 
undemocratic countries with less developed institutions and inadequate rule of law, the field 
of political risk has acquired especially great significance. In order to keep up with 
international and domestic demand, as well as maintain profit levels, there has been and will 
continue to be a search for new sources of petroleum reserves. This has pushed the extractive 
industries to invest in new territories, some of which pose potential risks for new investments. 
These trends are changing where and how oil and gas companies conduct their business, as 
many of the political risks that face the extractive industries stem from the political, 
institutional and structural framework of the host country. 
The core of this study has been the investigation of the assumption that high levels of 
democracy constitute low levels of political risk. The assumption that high levels of 
democracy constitute low levels of political risk implies, conversely, that low levels of 
democracy constitute high levels of political risk. The debate around this assumption is an 
essential part of this research study; its validity was tested through conducting an industry-
specific political risk analysis, using the case of Statoil’s operations in Angola. Angola poses 
an interesting case for analyzing political risk in the oil and gas sector, as it exhibits many of 
the qualities that are found amongst these “new” actors in the oil industry. Furthermore, 
additional and new research on the risk of investing in these emerging markets is more 
relevant than ever before. The stipulation of the relevance of this research study is based on 
the following two main points: firstly, the general decline in the level of democracy in Sub-
Saharan Africa; secondly, the fact that many of the current oil and gas resources are located in 
these very areas, i.e. in undemocratic and unstable countries. Moreover, there is little research 
on the effects the level of democracy has on the industry-specific risk, in this case the oil and 
gas industry. Hence further research on this area is both relevant and necessary. 
 The political risk analysis shows that the political risks that face Statoil in the 
undemocratic nation of Angola are in fact not high. The analysis concludes with a result that 
indicates that investment in Angola poses a medium level of political risk. This challenges the 
abovementioned assumption, as the political risks are not necessarily higher in an 
undemocratic country. This study finds that the political risk associated with Angola is in the 
short- to mid-term seen as stable and medium; however, there are simmering tendencies and 
trends that currently point to a different long-term political risk picture.  
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Opsomming 
 
In ‘n wêreld waar opkomende markte die ekonomiese groei van die wêreld toenemend 
voortdryf en ‘n toenemende deel van die wêreld se energie voorraad van politiese onstabiele 
of ondemokratiese lande met minder ontwikkelde instellings en onvoldoende regering kom, 
het die veld van politieke risiko groot waarde gekry. Om by te hou by die internasionale en 
plaaslike vraag, sowel as om winsvlakke te handhaaf, is en sal daar altyd ‘n soektog na nuwe 
bronne van petroleum reserwes wees. Dit het die ekstraksie industrieë gedruk om in nuwe 
gebiede te belê waarvan sommiges potensiële risiko’s het vir nuwe beleggings. Hierdie 
neigings verander waar en hoe olie- en petrolmaatskappye hul besigheid doen omdat baie van 
die politieke risiko’s wat die ekstraksie industrieë moet hanteer voortvloei uit die politieke, 
institusionele en strukturele raamwerk van die gasheerland.  
Die kern van hierdie studie was die ondersoek van die aanname dat hoë vlakke van 
demokrasie aanleiding gee tot lae vlakke van politieke risiko. Die aanname dat hoë vlakke 
van demokrasie aanleiding gee tot hae vlakke van politieke risiko impliseer dat lae vlakke van 
demokrasie aanleiding gee tot hoë vlakke van politieke risiko. Die debat rondom hierdie 
aanname is ‘n noodsaaklike deel van hierdie navorsingstudie; die geldigheid daarvan is 
getoets deur die uitvoering van ‘n industrie-spesifieke politieke risiko analise, deur gebruik te 
maak van die geval van Statoil se operering in Angola. Angola is ‘n interessante geval vir die 
ontleding van politieke risiko in die olie en petrolsektor, omdat dit baie van die kwaliteite 
toon wat onder die “nuwe” rolspelers in die olie-industrie gevind word. Verder is bykomende 
en nuwe navorsing op die risiko van belegging in hierdie opkomende markte meer relevant. 
Die stipulasie van hierdie relevansie van hierdie navorsingstudie is gebaseer op die volgende 
twee punte: eerstens, die algemene afname in die vlak van demokrasie in Sub-Sahara Afrika; 
tweedens, die feit dat baie van die huidige olie en petrolbronne in hierdie areas geleë is, d.i in 
ondemokratiese en onstabiele lande. Daar is ook min navorsing oor die uitwerking wat 
demokrasie het op die industrie-spesifieke risiko, in hierdie geval die olie en petroleum 
industrie. Daarom is verdere navorsing in hierdie area beide relevant en noodsaaklik.  
 Die politieke risiko ontleding wys dat die politieke risikos wat Statoil in die gesig staar 
in die ondemokrastiese nasie van Angola nie hoog is nie. Die ontleding sluit af met ‘n 
gevolgtrekking wat toon dat belegging in Angola ‘n medium vlak van politieke risiko toon. 
Dit daag die bogenoemde aanname uit, omdat die politieke risiko’s nie noodwendig hoog is in 
‘n ondemokratiese land nie. Hierdie studie vind dat die politieke risiko wat met Angola 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
v 
 
geassosieer word in die kort tot middel termyn is en as stabiel en medium beskou word; daar 
is egter neigings wat dui op ‘n ander langtermyn politieke risiko prent. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 General introduction 
Political risk
1
 matters. In a world where large parts of the global energy supply comes from 
politically unstable and undemocratic countries, the field of political risk has become more 
significant than ever before. The world’s economic growth is increasingly driven by emerging 
markets, that is, countries with less defined rule of law, less developed institutions and greater 
political instability. These new trends demand a shift in the way that companies operating 
internationally conduct their business. Companies need to understand and analyze these risks, 
and understand how politics affects the markets in which they operate, if their business is to 
flourish (Bremmer and Keat, 2009). Companies have always faced different types of political 
risks, such as terrorism, corruption, civil unrest, government policy change, and seizure of 
assets. According to Christina Davis from the Aon Corporation, such exposure to risk has 
never been as great as today: “people are doing business in more countries and in a more 
diverse range of countries than ever before” (Davis in Wood, 2009: 1). Political risk is 
everywhere and, in the words of Ian Bremmer, president of the Eurasia Group: “There has 
never been a time in the post-war period when political risk has mattered more” (Bremmer in 
Wood, 2009: 1). 
 Oil is considered the most viable source of energy available and it has become one of 
the basic building blocks of modern society. The global economy is completely dependent on 
the oil and gas industry, and access to oil has consequently become a matter of national 
security for the industrialized world (Shelly, 2005: 1-2). There is an increased flow of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) globally, and the extractive industries are among the key contributors 
to this trend. Multinational companies (MNCs) across the world compete to capture an early 
market share in the oil and gas industry as the gap between supply and demand is getting 
smaller (Shelly, 2005: 1-2). The extractive industries, oil in particular, have been the most 
sensitive area for foreign involvement, particularly in emerging markets (Lax, 1983: 30). The 
current trend is that these oil reserves are being extracted from emerging markets, and often 
unstable and undemocratic places in particular such as Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, Angola, and 
Ethiopia; this makes further research into the political risk tied to such investments essential. 
 The core of this study is an examination of the assumption that high levels of 
                                                        
1
 The term ‘political risk’ is used broadly in this study, incorporating socio-political risks as these pose 
industry-specific risks for MNCs (Frynas and Mellahi, 2003:547). This will be outlined further in 
Chapter Two in section 2.3.3. 
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democracy constitute low levels of political risk. The assumption that high levels of 
democracy constitute low levels of political risk implies, conversely, that low levels of 
democracy constitute high levels of political risk. This research study therefore examines the 
link between democracy and the political risks for oil and gas companies. The basic notion 
that FDI and MNCs prefer to operate in democratic conditions and that democratic 
dispensations appeal to MNCs and FDI is widely debated among scholars (Jakobsen, 2012: 
99). Li and Resnick (2003), Jensen (2003, 2006) and Jakobsen (2012) suggest that 
democracies have qualities that affect foreign investors positively. On the other hand, 
O’Donell (1978) argues that MNCs in fact can benefit from autocratic regimes, proposing that 
MNCs have an affinity for authoritarian regimes. Olson (1993) differentiates between long-
term and short-term autocratic leaders, who produce different investment climates. Li and 
Resnick (2003) note that if the regime uses its unchecked power to control labor unions and 
wages, repress popular criticism of foreign capital, stifle disgruntled opposition parties, offer 
the MNCs generous rates of return and provide sensible macroeconomic policies, foreign 
investors may benefit from autocracy, at least in the short run. The assumption that 
democracies offer the best environment for MNCs and FDI is built on the argument that 
democracy has a positive effect on a number of segments in a society, which in turn benefits 
foreign direct investors, such as property rights, rule of law, stability, and the likelihood of 
expropriation (Jakobsen, 2012: 100). Non-democratic nations have a number of 
characteristics that tend to make them politically riskier than democratic nations. The study is 
based on the widely accepted perception among scholars that democratic institutions attract 
FDI, since there is low political risk associated with investment in democracies. In this study 
a positive correlation argument is adopted, meaning that high levels of democracy lead to 
reduce political risk for MNCs. With that as a starting point, the question then becomes: Does 
this positive correlation still apply when looking at the case of Angola? 
 As the second largest producer of oil in Sub-Saharan African, and with one of the 
fastest growing economies on the African continent, the civil-war torn country of Angola has 
yet to meet its full potential. It is a country in the middle of an oil boom, with multinational 
companies flocking to get their share, yet there is much more to this country than just a 
growing economy and vast oil reserves.  
 According to Freedom House, the democratic developments made in Sub-Saharan 
Africa through building democratic institutions over the past generation are coming undone. 
After two decades of significant gains, the continent has experienced a steady decline in 
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democracy over recent years. Lack of adherence to the rule of law, violation of the freedoms 
of expression and association, widespread corruption and discrimination against women 
remain serious issues in many Sub-Saharan countries (Freedom House, 2012). This research 
study will offer an extensive investigation into the way that levels of democracy play out as a 
political risk factor for oil and gas companies operating in Angola, more specifically for the 
company of Statoil.    
1.2 Preliminary literature review 
 
The literature used in this research has been divided into four categories; the texts range from 
older studies with valuable contributions to this field to new texts with more recent 
information. The themes are divided into four categories as follows: firstly, political risk 
theory, analysis, and conceptualization; secondly; the contextualizing of industry-specific 
risks in the oil and gas industry; thirdly, democracy, its measurement and the Freedom House 
Index; and lastly, the analysis of political risk for oil and gas companies in Angola.  
The first category, political risk theory and analysis, concerns the conceptualization of 
political risk analysis, the associated theories, and the theoretical framework based on the 
theories of rational choice and decision-making. There is an immense quantity of literature on 
political risk; however, one of the main books reviewed here is Brink (2004) Measuring 
Political Risk to Foreign Investment. Brink’s book has especially aided the development of 
the theoretical framework of decision-making theory and rational choice. The 
conceptualization of political risk itself is largely based on the work of Robock (1971), 
Korbin (1978, 1979, 1981), Fitzpatrick (1983), Simon (1982), Lax (1983), Alon and Martin 
(1996), Alon et al. (2006) Brink (2004), Alon and Herbert (2009) and Jakobsen (2012). These 
scholars have been utilized for their theoretical and conceptual insights into the field of 
political risk theory and political risk analysis. The authors presented in this section illustrates 
the evolution of the term ‘political risk’, as well as the debate in the literature around the lack 
of consensus on how term ‘political risk’ should be defined.  This will be explored in the 
second chapter of the research study.  
The second category concerns political risk for the oil and gas industry, meaning 
industry-specific risks. The literature that will be covered in regards to this section includes 
Lax’s (1983) Political Risk in the Oil and Gas Industry, Hallmark and Whited (2001), Frynas 
and Mellahi (2003), Alon et al. (2006), Alon and Herbert (2009), Berlin (2003), and Bremmer 
and Keat (2009). These articles and books underline the link between the oil and gas industry 
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and political risk analysis, which will also be explored further in the Second Chapter of the 
research study.  
The third category, the nature of democracy, will firstly look at the concept of 
democracy, with special reference to the writing of Robert Dahl (1971). Dahl’s 
conceptualization of the concept of is widely accepted as valid. Furthermore the debate 
concerning the impact that democracy has on MNCs will be elucidated by the articles and 
books by O’Donnell (1978), Olson (1993), Li and Resnick (2003) Jensen (2003, 2006) and 
Jakobsen (2012), as these authors cover the main perspectives on the debate itself, as well as 
by further investigation and illustration of democracy’s putative positive impact on the levels 
of political risk. In order to establish the level of democracy in the case of this study, namely 
Angola, Freedom House’s ranking will be utilized and conceptualized. This third theme will 
be discussed in the both the second and third chapters of this research study. Freedom House 
has been chosen as it is an independent organization, whose objective is to promote freedom 
around the world and to speak out against breaches of democracy (Freedom House, 2014a). 
Their leading publication, Freedom in the World, is widely perceived as a crucial source in 
the development of democracy; hence their freedom framework has been chosen as the 
indicator of democracy for this research study. The research study adopts a thick
2
 
understanding of the concept of democracy as a premise for the research. The link between 
freedom and democracy, and the measurement of freedom as a measurement of democracy, is 
discussed in detail in Chapter Three. The study follows the logic of a broader or thicker 
conceptualization of democracy, where freedom is a necessary cornerstone of any democracy; 
consequently the measurement of freedom is also is a measurement of democracy.  
The fourth category, the applied theory, is covered in the fourth chapter of the study. 
The model for political risk analysis will be applied in order to assess the political risks that 
oil and gas companies face in Angola. The model and the methodology that will be used are 
based on work of Boshoff and Lambrechts (2011) in their article “Investing in Troubled 
Territories. The Oil and Gas Industry in the Ogden region of Eastern Ethiopia: An Increasing 
Political Risk to Foreign Investors”. This model has been chosen for this research study based 
on two of its key features. Firstly, it is specifically tailored to measure industry-specific risks; 
the risk factors of measurement have as such been chosen accordingly. Secondly, the 
literature used in the development of the model – Lax (1983), Berlin (2003) and Alon et al. 
(2006) – is key in the industry-specific risk literature, as well as in this particular research 
                                                        
2
 See section 3.3 for the conceptualization of the broader or thick democracy concept.  
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study. Furthermore the model, which is built on the model in Alon et al. (2006), is a country-
specific analysis and not a firm-specific model. Thus, this model is seen as particularly 
suitable for this research study. The Boshoff and Lambrechts (2011) model incorporates three 
types of political risk – host country political risk, company political risk and international 
political risk. Each of the three risk types contains a set of factors and indicators. The factors 
are weighed depending on the impact that factors have relative to the analysis and the other 
factors. The sum of the weighted factors scores provides an overall political risk rating score 
(OPRR) for the country or region under investigation. The OPRR determines the investment 
and the political risk indication of the country under assessment, which will be the end result 
of this specific political risk analysis.  
1.3 Research question  
The increased interest and activity in emerging markets has made political risk analysis a 
necessity for companies seeking to establish themselves in less developed and unstable areas 
of the world. When assessing the risk to possible profits of an investment, it is crucial to 
conduct a political risk analysis. A risk analysis refers to the entire process from identifying 
the risks, evaluating them, and to actually responding to the various risks in one way or 
another (Lindeberg & Morndal 2002: 2).   
 By researching the link between high levels of democracy and low levels of political 
risk, the aim is to falsify or confirm this link, with special reference to the oil and gas industry 
in Angola. Can one assume that high levels of democracy in fact equal a low level of political 
risk for an investor? Based on the issues that have been raised in this chapter following 
research questions are presented:  
- Do high levels of democracy constitute low levels of political risk for oil and gas 
companies? 
In order to answer this question the two following sub-question is posed to complement and 
support the main research question:  
- What is the level of democracy present in Angola?  
- What is the level of political risk that Statoil faces in operating in the oil and gas industry in 
Angola?
3
   
The aim of this research study is thus to conduct a political risk analysis in order to 
                                                        
3
 The level of political risk found for Statoil in Angola is expected to be translatable to the broader 
industrial sector within Angola, as there are not any particular company-specific risks tied to Statoil.  
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answer the above research questions. A political risk analysis, in its attempt to manage the 
uncertainties of investments for the investor, can be seen as a rational attempt at problem 
solving (Brink, 2004: 30). Externally, the analysis examines the environment and, internally, 
the individuals’ understanding of reality in order to comprehend and assist in solving 
problems that the investor faces (Boshoff & Lambrechts, 2011: 1). Political risk analysis sets 
out to assess the probability that various factors within a political system will affect business 
and investment climates in such a way that forecast profit would be negatively impacted 
(Brink, 2004: 21). 
1.4 Relevance and objectives of the research study 
This research study has two main objectives. The first objective is to test the assumption that 
high levels of democracy imply low levels of political risk. Establishing the present level of 
democracy in Angola will test this assumption, and subsequently conducting a political risk 
analysis of a company operating within that context will establish how the level of democracy 
affects the level of political risk. The second objective is to analyze what the actual level of 
political risk is for Statoil operating in Angola by using the risk model developed by Boshoff 
and Lambrechts (2011).         
 MNCs around the world realize the importance of an early market share, even in 
locations that may seem to have high-risk prospects (Alon et al., 2006: 623-624). Thus, 
companies can be said to be “forced” to engage in markets that are not classified as 
democratic, in order to get their share of the market. Undemocratic institutions and 
authoritarian leaders characterize many of these emerging markets, where much of the new oil 
and gas reserves are to be found. These tendencies are also seen in Ethiopia and Algeria, 
nations with oil and gas reserves, which also are classified as undemocratic by Freedom 
House (Freedom House, 2014a). As such Angola poses an interesting case for analyzing 
political risk in the oil and gas sector, as it exhibits many of the qualities that are found 
amongst these “new” actors in the oil industry. Furthermore, additional and new research into 
the risk of investing in these emerging markets is more relevant than ever before. On the one 
hand, these markets are new investment opportunities in countries where it has not been 
possible to invest in before while, on the other hand, one can observe a process whereby the 
level of democracy is declining in Sub-Saharan Africa in general. This is the paradox of the 
Angolan case: a flourishing oil nation on the one side, and what is described as an 
authoritarian and corrupt regime on the other side by multiple Norwegian NGOs criticizing 
Statoil’s involvement (Skedsmo, Bade & Lunde, 2013; Aftenposten, 2014). Yet MNCs with 
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high ethical and moral codes of conduct for their own companies choose to invest in Angola. 
As mentioned, one example of this is Norway. Angola is the most important African country 
for Norway, because Norway’s nationally owned oil company (NOC), Statoil, controls 10 
percent of the total oil production in Angola, as well as being Statoil’s largest oil producer 
outside Norway (Statoil 2014; Hanssen 2012). This paradox brings us to the debate about the 
concept that high risk equals high turnover, also called the risk-return trade-off principle:  
“The principle that potential return rises with an increase in risk. Low levels of uncertainty 
(low-risk) are associated with low potential returns, whereas high levels of uncertainty (high-
risk) are associated with high potential returns” (Investopedia, 2014). As Frynas (1998) writes 
in his article “Political Instability and Business: Focus on Shell in Nigeria”, the apparent 
contradiction arises where Shell invests in what have been labeled as highly unstable and 
high-risk areas, such as Nigeria, Angola and Somalia, and choses to accept more risks in order 
to obtain higher profits (Frynas, 1998: 462-475). This debate is important, because it 
questions the ethical and moral codes of conduct that these MNCs adopt. Although this 
research issue extends beyond the scope of this study, it is nevertheless essential, as 
reputational mechanisms need to be taken into consideration. The issue will accordingly be 
kept in mind throughout this study. Western companies from well-established democracies, 
where the rule of law prevails, property rights are respected and the government fulfills its 
obligations to their citizens, “blindly” invest in undemocratic and corrupt regimes, where the 
oil revenues fall into the hands of the rich and, in the Angolan case specifically, the coffers of 
the presidential family. This research study does not investigate reputational risks, but 
acknowledges the concept and the relationships. The Angolan case will be further 
contextualized and outlined in the third chapter of the study. 
 The stipulation of the relevance of this research study is based on the following two 
main points presented in this section: firstly, the general decline in the level of democracy in 
Sub-Saharan Africa; secondly, the fact that much of the current oil and gas resources are 
located in these very areas, i.e. in undemocratic and unstable countries. Moreover, there is 
little research on the effects the level of democracy has on the industry-specific risk, in this 
case the oil and gas industry. The literature rather deals with MNCs in general, and is to a 
large extent not focused on a specific industry. Hence further research into this area is both 
relevant and necessary, which reinforces the relevance of this research study.  
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1.5 Research design and methodology 
The starting point is to design a feasible research strategy so that the research can be 
conducted according to the nature of the research questions. The research design provides the 
framework for the generation and analysis of data according to the priorities set by the 
researcher (Bryman, 2001). Thus, to be able to establish the result of the research, the 
research design and methodology will stipulate how the data will be collected, organized and 
integrated into the study.  
This is a qualitative, single-case research study drawing on secondary data; the 
research will rely on existing data appropriate to the research question found in academic 
journals, articles, books, risk reports, democracy reports and newspaper articles. The data will 
be collected throughout the research process in order to allow adjustments along the way. The 
scope of the research is on the micro level, as it focuses only on the micro or industry-specific 
risks that are tied to the oil and gas industry, specifically looking at the case of Statoil in 
Angola. The use of a single case implies that the research study has a case study design; this 
design has been chosen because it allows for in-depth rather than wide-ranging study. A case 
study can be conceptualized as an empirical investigation that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real life context, and according yo Yin (1994) the purpose of a case 
study is not to obtain information about the problem area but to apply the data to a specific 
case (Yin, 1994). Furthermore, as noted by Burnham, Lutz, Grant and Layton-Henry (2008), a 
case study is most appropriate for a qualitative approach. Furthermore, a case study allows for 
a very complete account of a given phenomenon (Burnham et al., 2008: 66).  The case of 
Angola has been chosen as it embodies several of the features that characterize emerging oil 
and gas markets today. The study is built on existing secondary data in order to analyze the 
causal relationship that the research question sets out to answer concerning the relationship 
between democracy and political risk for oil companies. The research study is explanatory, as 
it seeks to provide a better understanding of, and gain insight into, the topic. The study is also 
descriptive in that it seeks to describe the situation and events (Babbie & Mouton, 2005: 80). 
Furthermore, the research is causal, as it aims to establish a cause-and-effect relationship 
between the variables (Babbie & Mouton, 2005: 81; Newman, 2006: 33-35). 
 The theoretical framework of the study is based on problem-solving and decision-
making theory, outlined in the second chapter. The third chapter, the descriptive section, will 
describe the current situation in Angola, as well as contextualizing the Angolan oil and gas 
industry. The qualitative data analysis of the information from the secondary literature will be 
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structured in the form of a risk analysis. A political risk analysis entails the complete process 
from identifying the risks and assessing these in order to actually respond to the various risks 
(Lindeberg and Morndal, 2002: 2). The causal aspect of the study thus includes the 
application of the risk model to the case of political risk for Statoil in Angola, which will be 
applied in the fourth chapter.  
1.6 Limitations and delimitation of the study  
The intangible concept of political risk is difficult to define and conceptualize. The term 
political risk is not simply a reality standing on its own, as it does not refer to a specific 
object, state of mind, or a specific set of actions. Thus, one of the limitations of the research 
becomes the study of political risk in itself. If there is agreement on one thing in the literature, 
it is that there is no consensus on the definition of the term ‘political risk’ (Alon et al., 2006; 
Jakobsen, 2012; Alon & Herbert, 2009; Frynas & Mellahi, 2003; Brink, 2004). Furthermore 
the measurement and observation of political risk to a great extent depend on subjective 
individual judgment, which in some cases, according to Brink (2004), works as a handicap for 
political risk analysis (Brink, 2004: 2). Due to this limitation, in the political risk model for 
analysis it is essential to balance out the subjectivity of the user and provide a more objective 
estimation of risk that reflects the researched information.  The role of the model of analysis 
is, according to Lax (1983), to refine the list and organize the variables, their relationship, 
flows and consequences into a useful analytical tool (Lax, 1983: 113-114).  Thus, by applying 
a political risk model one aids this particular limitation to the study, as well as work as an 
objective framework of analysis for the researcher.  
 A second limitation that should be acknowledged is the single case research design in 
itself, as one cannot draw broad generalizations on the basis of this single research study. The 
context in which the oil and gas companies operate may not be translatable to other industries 
operating within Angola.  
Undertaking field study in Angola as well as the collection of primary data would 
have been of benefit to this research study. However, as no financial resources were available, 
it was not possible to conduct a field study nor collect primary data. This limitation has been 
overcome by using up-to date-reports by Freedom House, descriptive literature on the state of 
democracy in Angola, as well as for the extractive industries. The literature used is adequately 
reliable and representative background for the purpose of conducting a political risk analysis.  
The study will be limited in scope to focus on the research on the casual relationship 
between high levels of democracy in relation to the level of political risks, referring to lack of 
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democracy as a political risk factor specifically for the oil and gas sector. The research will be 
further delimited in its historical span and incidents after June 2014 will not be included in the 
study, and as the study will deal only with the Angolan case.  
1.7 Chapter outline  
Chapter Two examines the theoretical framework, which serves as the foundation for this 
research study. Essential terms related to democracy and the theoretical framework related to 
the literature on democracy are conceptualized, as are the key political risk terms crucial for 
this research study.  
Chapter Three will firstly contextualize the oil and gas industry, as well as the 
extractive industries in the Angolan case specifically. Moreover, the level of democracy in 
Angola will be examined and contextualized, especially by looking at the research of 
Freedom House.  
In Chapter Four the political risk analysis model will be presented and applied by 
analyzing a set of factors and a subsequent risk report generated. The risk analysis presented 
will be used to test the research questions of this study.  
Chapter Five will answer the research question and reflect upon the accomplishments 
of this research. Furthermore, possible improvements and avenues for further research are 
addressed. The goal is to make recommendations for companies seeking to invest, or who 
already have invested, in undemocratic countries. 
 
1.8 Conclusion 
This chapter serves as a general introduction to this research study. Furthermore, it provides a 
technical outline of the methodology, research design, limitations and delimitation, as well as 
a chapter guide. The objective of this study is to investigate links between high levels of 
democracy and low levels of political risk, the aim being to falsify or confirm this assumption 
when looking at the Angolan case. The next chapter provides the theoretical framework for 
this research study and will conceptualize the key terms within the field of political risk. The 
following chapter thus provides a foundation and framework for the remainder of the research 
study.  
 
  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 11 
Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework and Contextualization of Political 
Risk in the Oil and Gas Industry 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Multinational companies looking for new opportunities in uncharted territories and markets 
are often challenged with many unknown realities. Consequently, there is a need for 
companies to examine and identify these unknown conditions, which can translate into 
various risks.  Risk is a constantly present factor in business decision-making processes, 
determining the appropriate ways to manage and mitigate such risks in order to achieve 
success in such business investments (Berlin et al., 2003: 1). This is especially important in 
the oil and gas industry, as there are high economic rewards at stake and as a result of the 
extensive time frame required for the contemplation of such investments. Still, while the oil 
and gas industry is susceptible to market price and commercial risks, it is also an industry that 
is highly exposed to political risks, given that the production pattern is directly related to the 
geopolitical location of oil reserves (Berlin et al., 2003: 2). Political risk management in the 
energy industry is of the utmost importance and should therefore play a key role in business 
strategies (Berlin et al., 2003: 2).  
This chapter has three main components: firstly, it will review the political risk 
literature, which provides the theoretical framework that serves as the foundation for this 
research study; secondly, the key risk terms and concepts will be conceptualized; and thirdly, 
the concept of democracy is conceptualized and discussed in the final sections of the chapter.  
2.2 Theoretical framework: Rational Choice Theory and Problem Solving Theory  
The political risk literature that serves as the foundation of the theoretical framework of this 
study can be divided into two broad camps of scholars; the first group argues that the study of 
political risk has not yet been able to create a coherent theory of political risk, while the 
second group of scholars asserts the conceptualization and development of problem-solving 
and decision-making theory as the theoretical framework for understanding political risk. 
Political risk analysis is often criticized for failing to explicitly outline the causal relationship 
between variables of interest (Lax, 1983; Jakobsen, 2012; Brewer, 1993). The logical 
consequence of this shortcoming is arguably that any coherent theory of political risk has yet 
to evolve. As Lax (1983) argues, there are no general theories of political risk; analysts do not 
cover the area of study rigorously enough to allow for theory building (Lax, 1983).  This issue 
is linked to the lack of a clearly defined dependent variable. The dependent variable may be 
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an industry or company, or even project-specific, making it difficult to generalize to a broader 
theoretical framework. Most approaches identify the independent variables, although this is 
not always the case. There remains a major conceptual gap between identifying the field of 
study and the dependent and independent variables, on the one hand, and developing a theory 
of political risk, on the other (Lax, 1983: 110-111). Lax further argues that just as the 
gathering of facts does not produce understanding, the gathering of variables does not create a 
theory (1983: 111). As a conceptual tool for understanding, a theory organizes the variables, 
revealing how they interact and why. Here lies a serious shortcoming of nearly all approaches 
to political risk analysis: they are conceptually unable to explain why and how a given set of 
political risk variables affects the interests and goals of companies. (Lax, 1983: 111). In 
addition, Simon (1984) argues that there are three key reasons as to why a cohesive theory of 
political risk has not been developed. Firstly, the pressure for immediate results has been part 
of the reason for the lack of systematic analysis of political risk. Additional factors include a 
general skepticism among companies concerning the operationalization and quantification of 
non-economic variables, a preference for in-depth single-country analysis, and the lack of 
clearly defined boundaries for the discipline. Such skepticism is arguably rooted in a 
perception that political risk is too unstructured and subjective as a concept to be exposed to 
systematic quantitative analysis. The second factor obstructing the growth of a theory in 
political risk analysis is the problem of time pressure in companies that often favor sporadic 
individual country studies over a broader systematic cross-national analysis. A third obstacle 
is the nature of the study in itself. Simon here refers to the difficulty of economists, political 
scientists, business management scholars and legal experts communicating with each other, 
because their respective training and interests produce different ways of looking at the 
problem, which in turn precludes a collective growth in the discipline (Simon, 1984: 124). 
 More recently, Jakobsen (2012) describes theory building within the field as an 
“immense task given the assumption that political risk is a multidimensional phenomenon” 
(Jakobsen 2012: 39). The result of this, according to Jakobsen (2012), is rather unfortunate; 
the very firms that specialize in political risk assessment do so seemingly without basing their 
advice on any theoretical foundation (Jakobsen, 2012: 40). The lack of a coherent view on 
what constitutes the theoretical framework still remains a debated issue amongst scholars 
today, as illustrated by Jakobsen in his 2012 book, Political Risk and the Multinational 
Company. 
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 In contrast to this view, the second camp within the field has put forward problem-
solving and decision-making theory as the theoretical foundation of political risk analysis, 
which will form the theoretical premise for this research study. Every aspect of business is 
ultimately a result of a decision made, a process of weighing and considering alternative 
possibilities in a given situation. Simon et al. (1987) contend that what steers the course of a 
society and its economic and governmental organizations is the process of decision-making 
and problem solving (Simon et al., 1987: 11). Problem solving includes the work of fixing 
agendas by selecting issues that are to be given attention, setting goals and creating an 
appropriate plan of action. Following this is the decision-making section, which includes the 
evaluation and finally choosing the decision to make (Simon et al., 1987: 11).  
The theory of rational choice is one of the leading theories in the understanding of 
human behavior. This theoretical framework has been a dominant paradigm in economics, but 
in recent years it has become more widely used in other disciplines as well, such as the social 
sciences (Green, 2002: 2). Based on the same principles, decision-making theory and rational 
choice theory refer to the concept of rationality, meaning that a person acts upon balancing 
costs against benefits in order to arrive at a result that maximizes advantages. The starting 
point of such an analysis is the consideration of the choice of behavior of one or more 
individual decision-making units, which in basic economies are most often consumers or 
firms (Green, 2002: 2). According to this logic, the choice made by a company or an 
individual reflects the most preferred feasible alternative implied by the given preferences 
(Green, 2002: 46). Tversky and Khaneman (1986) ague that rational choice is logical rather 
than a psychological analysis of risk and value, and that normative analysis is used to forecast 
and explain actual behavior. Rational choice theory is regarded as a normative model of the 
archetype decision-maker, rather than an illustration of what real people do, as it tries to 
predict and explain why and how choices are made. People are generally seen as efficient in 
pursuing their goals, especially when there is an incentive to do so, and accordingly rational 
choice can be seen as a maximization process. Moreover, competition favors rational 
individuals and organizations, as optimal decisions increase the chances of survival in a 
competitive environment, and a minority of rational individuals can sometimes impose 
rationality on the whole market (Tversky and Khaneman, 1986: 251-252).  
A political risk analysis adds value to the maximization process by laying out the 
potential costs against benefits, by outlining what is the best option of investment. Thus, when 
conducting a risk analysis, one draws the attention of the decision-maker to the different 
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problems that political risk might pose to the profitability of the investment. This creates an 
awareness of the problem, which means that management steps can be taken in order to avoid 
risks or gain profit from them (Brink, 2004: 30). According to Simon (1986), decision-
making usually follows a six-step process, as outlined in the diagram below.  
 
Figure 1. Decision-making process                                      (Adapted from Simon, 1986:  11). 
In order to identify, assess and manage a situation, political risk analysis evaluates 
both the external environment and the internal view of the business, in relation to the 
environment. Once a political risk analysis is conducted, it draws the attention to the political 
risks that can affect the profitability of the investment. Investments in countries that have high 
levels of corruption require both problem solving and decision-making among the people 
involved in the process. Political risk analysis assists in coming to a solution and helps 
rationalize the choice. As such, it becomes evident that solving the problem of where to invest 
or expand operations requires observations in order to find potential solutions; a political risk 
analysis requires observations in order to find potential solutions (Brink, 2004: 30-31).  
 Decision-making theory complements problem-solving theory, and it is generally 
assumed to be a theory underlying rational decision making in conditions of uncertainty. 
Uncertainty may derive from limited knowledge or from the objective random nature of the 
process occurring in or around the decision-making environment (Brink, 2004: 30). In 
problem solving potential solutions require a consecutive ordering of ideas that can be tested. 
It becomes clear that the solving of the problem of “where to invest” requires observations in 
order to find potential solutions. As the words “problem” and “solving” indicate, political risk 
analysis is concerned with situations in which one or more choices must be made, often under 
conditions of uncertainty (Beroggi 1999, in Brink 2004: 30). In both problem solving and 
decision-making management is required to make critical decisions on which strategy will be 
followed. Decisions may be strategic and often affect the long-term course of the company as 
a whole. Decision-making in smaller issues can be more tactical and operational, thus taken 
on a day-to-day basis within the company. Nevertheless, all decisions are important to the 
organization’s wellbeing (Simon, 1986). For the purposes of this study, it is argued that 
problem-solving and decision-making theory is the theoretical foundation of the field of 
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political risk analysis, and it will accordingly also be used as the theoretical premise for this 
research study. 
2.3 Conceptualizing key terminology  
The objective in this section is to conceptualize the key political risk terms that are seen as 
essential to the study. The foundation that is built in the following sections is crucial, as it will 
provide the framework for presenting and analyzing the research data in the following 
chapters. First, the conceptualization of the term ‘political risk’ will be provided, followed by 
a discussion on micro-macro risks and industry-specific risks to the oil and gas industry. 
Secondly, the concept of democracy, and the link between political risk and democracy is 
examined.  
2.3.1 Instability, risk and political risk  
The intangible concept of political risk is not easily defined; the one aspect the literature does 
agree on is that a consensus has not yet been reached on a definition of political risk (Alon, 
1996). A useful distinction to make when conceptualizing risk is the distinction between risk 
and instability. Instability is observable and can affect a company’s property, equipment or 
licenses. Instability can take the form of a riot, or new government legislation and can cause 
harm to a company’s assets. Risk, on the other hand, is not tangible, but rather a set of 
expectations concerning potential future instability that has market value and may regulate 
future revenue (Frynas and Mellahi, 2003: 545).  
Risk is a subjective perception of how instability could affect a firm, and it is assessed 
to predict the probability of different types of instability (Frynas and Mellahi, 2003: 545). 
Risk is defined by Lax (1983) as the “chance of injury, damage, or subjective loss, compared 
to a previous standard”, while the term ‘political’ refers to the class of decisions and events 
that concern the authoritative allocation of values and resources (Lax, 1983: 8). The term 
‘risk’ is commonly associated with words such as hazard, peril, loss, threat, vulnerability, 
danger, misfortune, adversary, which are words commonly used in reference to uncertain 
situations (Boshoff, 2010: 22). Risk and uncertainty are both abstract concepts, which are 
difficult to measure. The distinction between the two concepts is described by Lindeberg and 
Mørndal as follows: “A decision is called risky when the probability that an event will occur 
in the future is precisely known, for example a roulette game. In contrast, a decision is called 
uncertain when the probability is not precisely known” (2002: 19). Both of these terms refer 
to future likelihoods, but risk implies the ability to calculate probabilities and therefore to 
protect against and manage future contingencies, whilst uncertainty does not (Lax, 1983: 8). 
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Risk deals with measurable probabilities, while uncertainty deals with a subjective potential 
for a loss (Lax, 1983: 8) Brink (2004) argues that it is better to know what the risks are in 
order to manage them, rather than not knowing or being uncertain. Threats are recognized, 
Brink argues, as they are observed and measured, and as such one can plan ahead of them 
occurring, and predict or manage the threats (Brink, 2004: 3). 
 Political risk can be seen as a connected to risk, by being the analytical process that 
uses particular variables to forecast the possibility of events that may or may not affect an 
investment (Boshoff, 2010: 16). Political risk can assist in assessing how a business can be 
affected under different political scenarios (Moen, 2012: 17). As multinational companies 
work in a particular political environment, the phenomenon of risk must be assessed in a 
political setting. Political risk is a type of risk that investors, multinational companies, 
foreign-based organizations and governments face as a result of a politics-related situation, an 
unanticipated incident or environmental event. Political risk can be viewed as any political 
change that alters the expected outcome and value of a given economic action by changing 
the probability of achieving business goals (PWC, 2006). 
 Initially, the notion of political risk was narrowly based on the assumption of an 
inherently confrontational relationship between government and business (Alon & Herbert, 
2009). The most common definition of political risk in the early generation of scholars 
concentrated on hostile governmental actions (Fitzpatrick, 1983: 249); it is most commonly 
understood in the terms of host government interference with business operations (Korbin, 
1979: 67). Early political risk literature can generally be divided into two camps. The first 
group of scholars (Bunn and Mustafaoglu, 1978; Green, 1974; Thunell, 1977) defines 
political risk as the occurrence of any political events that might, directly or indirectly, affect 
foreign investors, such as expropriation, nationalization, tax increases and exchange controls. 
These incidents are normally “actions of governments” that directly obstruct the goals of 
multinational companies, which could result in the deterioration of the general investment 
climate of a country, and then causes losses for the firms (Jakobsen 2012: 30). The second 
group of scholars (Korbin, 1979, 1981, 1982; Poynter, 1982; Robock, 1971; Heenan, 1978) 
saw political events involving host-government interference with MNCs as the main direct 
cause of investor losses, that is, the chief form of political risk effects. Kobrin (1979) 
illustrates the view of the second group by stating that, “the emphasis on negative 
consequences of such government intervention entails an implicitly normative assumption 
that may not be universally valid” (Kobrin 1979: 69). Scholars in this second camp were 
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critical of the strong focus on political instability in arguing that the events that usually are 
associated with such instability occurred rather infrequently, arguing that scholars were too 
preoccupied with events such as coups and revolutions. Incidents that were less eye-catching, 
though often equally detrimental and far more frequent, risked being overlooked and under-
analyzed (Kobrin 1979, 1981; Lax 1983; Rummel and Heenan, 1978).  
The contemporary view considers risk in a broader context grounded in and influenced 
by many environmental factors (Alon & Herbet, 2009).  One of the most commonly used 
definitions of political risk is the definition by Stefan H. Robock, who draws the important 
distinction between political risk and instability, as well as the concepts of micro and macro 
political risk:  
Political risk in international business exists when discontinuities occur in the 
business environment, when they are difficult to anticipate, and when they 
result from political change. To constitute a “risk” these changes in business 
environment must have the potential for significantly affecting the profit or 
other goals of a particular enterprise (Robock, 1971: 7).  
Lax (1983) and Simon (1982) follow along the lines of the earlier scholars, who 
conceptualized a broader environmental context in the definition of political risk. Lax (1983) 
defines political risk as “the probability that the goals of a project will be affected by changes 
in the political environment. It is the likelihood that political changes will prompt a change in 
the investment climate regulating a project” (Lax 1983: 8). Simon’s (1982) conceptualization, 
which has become a widely accepted definition of political risk, states that “governmental or 
societal actions and policies, originating either within or outside the host country, and 
negatively affecting either a select group of, or the majority of, foreign business operations 
and investments” (Simon 1982: 68).  His definition is further developed in Alon (1996) and 
Alon and Martin (1998) by adding an economic dimension to the definition – firstly, because 
the economic climate is understood as a central source in the political risk climate; secondly, 
because politics and economic, and thus the associated risks, are often are inseparable; and 
thirdly, because adding this dimension provides a more complete and precise conception of 
political risk (Alon et al. 2006). Frynas and Mellahi (2003) further expand the 
conceptualization, describing risk as a non-tangible concept, but rather a bundle of 
expectations concerning potential future instability that has a market value and determines 
future earnings. Furthermore, they see the distinction between risk and instability as a useful 
starting point when trying to define the concept of political risk. Frynas and Mellahi (2003) 
identify three types of uncertainty in the political risk literature: political risk such as war; 
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government policy risk, which can involve expropriation measures; or social risk, which 
could manifest in the kidnapping of company staff. They further argue that the most common 
definitions of political risk exclude this third type of political risk, the social risk. A definition 
that excludes social risk is arguably too narrow to capture risk factors, which are often outside 
the sphere of the political process as, for example, in the case of Nigeria  (Frynas & Mellahi, 
2003: 547).  Bremmer and Keat (2009) also operate with a broader definition of political risk: 
“the probability that any event will turn into a measurable loss”. They further elaborate their 
definition by including risks such as global warming and demographic changes in their 
definition: “Political risk is the probability that a particular political action will produce 
changes in economic outcomes” (Bremmer and Keat, 2009: 4-10). 
 For the purpose of this research study a broader definition, which includes both a 
social and an economic dimension, is most appropriate, as a narrow definition would not be 
encompass the complex picture of the case in question. Thus, political risk is understood 
along the lines of the definitions presented in this section by Simon (1982), Frynas and 
Mellahi (2003), Alon et al. (2006) and Alon and Martin (2009). As their conceptualizations of 
political risk include multiple dimensions, they present a more holistic view of what political 
risk is and can be. Furthermore, as argued by Frynas and Mellahi (2003), risk should be 
interpreted as being primarily a company-specific or project-specific value assessment.  
2.3.2 Country risk  
Country risk is easily confused with political risk; nevertheless, the terms are intertwined and 
not easily separated. The term ‘country risk’ is often used to illustrate a variety of risk that can 
affect foreign investors. Country risk is usually taken to comprise all the many risks and 
uncertainties associated with conducting business across national borders, including those 
related to the economic, financial and political characteristics of a host nation (Jakobsen, 
2012: 37). The term ‘country risk’ as opposed to ‘political risk’ has been gaining prominence 
because it has a broader meaning in that it can include any risk specific to a given country, 
whereas political risk restricts the risks to those that are exclusively political in nature 
(Bouchet, Clark, & Groslambert, 2003: 11).  
However, Brink (2004) defines country risk as sovereign, credit and transfer risk. 
Country risk differs from political risk in the sense that country risk can be explained as 
potential financial losses as a result of problems arising from macro events in a country 
(Brink 2004: 18-19). The difference between political risk and country risk is explained by 
Brink (2004) as follows: political risk refers to the unwillingness of a country to repay loans, 
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while country risk is a country’s inability to repay loans. Thus, a country can experience one 
without the other, meaning that the two do not necessarily go hand in hand. This distinction 
between deliberate unwillingness and inability is essential; however, this can be hard to 
differentiate (Brink, 2004: 23). Economic and political variables as interrelated; behind a 
political decision to interfere with affairs of multinational companies can lie more 
fundamental economic or financial causes, and vice versa. Politics largely determines 
economic outcomes, including those that concern foreign investors (Jakobsen, 2012: 37). 
Thus Brink (2004) argues that it is important that country risk factors should be incorporated 
into a political risk analysis. The emphasis on the political factor is weighted less as a factor 
in a country risk analysis than it does in a political risk analysis. Political risk can therefore be 
seen as a factor of country risk, whereas economic indicators form a part of a factor of 
analysis undertaken in political risk, which may include political and societal factors and their 
indicators (Boshoff, 2010: 18). The global economy affects different spheres of a country and 
as such has political implications. As the two concepts are clearly interrelated, both concepts 
should be incorporated into a risk analysis.  
2.3.3 Micro and macro risks or industry-specific risk   
Making a distinction between micro and macro risks or industry-specific risk and the general 
political risk is not a novel approach (Robock, 1972; Kobrin, 1981, 1982; Lax, 1983; Alon & 
Herbert 2009; Alon et al., 2006; Simon, 1982). The terms micro and macro risk were 
originally coined by Robock in his 1971 article “Political Risk: Identification and 
Assessment”. According to Robock’s conceptualization, macro risks refer to large-scale and 
often dramatic socio-political incidents such as revolutions, warfare and substantial changes 
in investment rules – which may affect all businesses in the host country. Micro risks, on the 
other hand, are events, actions or changes that “are intended to affect only selected fields of 
business activity or foreign enterprises with specific characteristics” (Robock 1971: 9-10). 
Korbin (1981) defines the concepts as follows: “Macro risks are environmental events, which 
affect all foreign firms in a country without regard to organizational characteristics, and micro 
risks … are industry, firm, and even project specific” (Kobrin 1981: 253). Lax (1983) defines 
micro level risks as risks that specifically target particular sectors of the economy, types of 
firms, or even individual companies (Lax 1983: 10). 
 The micro-risk literature points to the even narrower concept of industry-specific risk. 
Alon and Herbert (2009) describe academic research on micro-political risk as “still in its 
infancy”. Most of the research to date has focused on macro-political risk, generating broadly 
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based insights into specific countries or regions. The lack of research on micro-political risk is 
probably the result of the difficulty in generalizing about risk that is specific to one case (Alon 
& Herbert 2009: 129). According to Lax (1983), the extractive industries, particularly oil, 
have long been the most sensitive area of foreign involvement, particularly in the developing 
world. There are a number of reasons as to why this is: the visibility of petroleum operations, 
and the importance of oil wealth and income to host economies. The vital role afforded to 
petroleum policies as the key to development, and the legacy of Western economic 
involvement in the developing countries, mean that the oil industry has proved to be 
especially sensitive to the turns of political events. As a consequence, the absolute and 
relative importance of oil in world affairs makes changes in the international industry 
politically significant (Lax, 1983: 30). Arguably this is still the case today; the terrorist attack 
on the joint British Petroleum (BP) and Statoil gas field of Amenas in Algeria on 16 January 
2013 illustrates how the oil and gas industry remains a key target for groups seeking to prove 
their point politically (Golob, 2013).  
Alon and Herbet (2009) argue that industries of strategic importance, such as natural 
resources, banking, finance and insurance, are more likely to be regulated than are industries 
of minor strategic importance, and thus face greater political risk (Alon & Herbet 2009: 129). 
Hallmark and Whited (2001) list a number of variables that affect industries such as oil and 
natural gas, electrical utility, and power companies: risk of wars and external threats; taxation 
systems; terrorism; civil and labor unrest; corruption; governmental regulations; repatriation 
restrictions; political instability; energy vulnerability; and environmental activism. Despite 
the long list of risks that the oil and gas industry are especially sensitive to, companies are 
arguably still “able and willing to work in almost any country in the world” (Hallmark & 
Whited 2001: 22). Lax (1983) classifies the industry-specific political risks posed to the oil 
and gas industry according to the issues involved; risk can as such be classified as transfer, 
operational, administrative/statutory, ownership, or contractual (Lax, 1983: 10). 
 Alon, Gurumoorthy, Mitchell and Steen (2006) make a narrower distinction between 
the risk that affects all sectors and, more specifically, the energy sector. Political risk 
variables such as war, terrorism, labor unrest, political instability and corruption are macro 
risk variables that will affect almost all sectors to varying degrees. Meanwhile, for the energy 
sector, variables such as energy vulnerability, oil embargoes, environmental activism and 
restrictions on oil exports can be identified as micro or industry-specific variables that 
especially affect the energy sector. One example of a risk that particularly affected oil and gas 
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companies is, for instance, the Iraq War, which has become a major political concern for 
companies looking to invest in the region. Another example is Russia, a nation that has 
established itself as an oil-producing nation, but the unfavorable tax-system poses substantial 
potential risks for investors. In Nigeria ethnic militant groups kidnapped staff of oil 
companies, demanding ransom or employment (Alon et al., 2006: 632). Alon et al. argue that 
it is essential that, even though companies in the oil and gas industry monitor the macro 
variables, they should pay special attention to the particular micro variables that may affect 
them to a larger extent than macro variables (Alon et al., 2006: 632). 
 Another distinction made in the literature is firm-specific risk, which refers to the 
notion of political risk as being specific to a given firm. Robock’s definition of political risk 
implies that changes in the business environment must have a potential for significantly 
affecting the profit or goals of a particular enterprise. It thus also follows that what is political 
risk for one firm may not be political risk for a different one (Robock, 1971: 7-8). Political 
risk is a subjective perception of how instability may affect the firm, and it is assessed to 
predict the likelihood of different types of instability (Frynas & Mellahi, 2003: 545). 
According to this logic, the risks that Shell face in Nigeria may differ from those that are 
facing Statoil. Shell’s history in Nigeria as well as their business strategy will affect what 
level and type of risk they are subjected to; thus the political risk other companies in the same 
area are subjected to may be completely different. The same logic can be applied to the case 
of Angola. How one industry or company is affected by the level of democracy in terms of 
political risk will differ, as each company’s history in the country, ties to the government and 
so on will determine the level of political risk that they may face.  
2.4 Qualitative versus quantitative risk analysis 
Political risk analysis is a multidisciplinary field; the normative nature of political risk 
analysis does not allow for complete objectivity. The objective of political risk analysis is to 
identify potential actions and to select the best course of action for a specific foreign 
investment (Brink, 2004: 31). In order to achieve this, the analyst needs to gain in-depth 
understanding of the investment environment of the host country; the needs of the investor; 
the elements in the host country and reputational impacts; and the effect these might have on 
the foreign investment (Brink, 2004: 32).   
Various political risk agencies only use qualitative methods of analysis and apply 
them to models, while many political risk analysts seeks to quantify what is traditionally seen 
subjective political, economic and social factors, and apply them to mathematical models 
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(Jessen, 2012: 21). Both qualitative and quantitative methods can be used in a political risk 
analysis; but versions that merge the two methods have been constructed into political risk 
models. An example of such a hybrid model is the one developed by Brink (2004) in the book 
Measuring Political Risk. Brink (2004) argues that the qualitative and quantitative approaches 
can be used in conjunction with one another, by merging the qualitative nature of soft 
variables and the quantitative hard variables into comprehensive political, social and 
economic factors of political risk (Brink, 2004: 12).  
Qualitative researchers conceptualize variables and refine concepts as a part of the 
process of measuring variables. In contrast, qualitative researchers form new concepts or 
refine concepts that are grounded in data (Neuman, 2006: 460). Qualitative research involves 
collecting information in depth from a small number of cases and lays emphasis on in-depth 
knowledge about them (Burnham et al., 2008: 40). Qualitative research is defined by Strauss 
and Carbin (1991: 11) as establishing “findings not arrived at by statistical procedures or 
other means of quantification”. Qualitative case studies are by nature exposed to the 
subjectivity of the researcher, as the researcher’s interpretation may be influenced by 
background, opinions and values (Lindeberg and Mørndal, 2002: 17). The advantage of the 
qualitative method in relation to political risk is that there are a large number of variables that 
interconnect and, by using the qualitative method, they are separated more easily. Some 
companies find that quantitative methods minimize the subjectivity bias inherent in using 
only qualitative methods (Lindeberg and Mørndal, 2002: 31). Tjin (1988: 145) defines 
quantitative research as follows: “any analytical procedure that is based on data that can 
theoretically lend themselves to statistical or mathematical operations”. There is a range of 
different quantitative methods; the most common approach is to predict the probability of the 
occurrence of a certain event through the use of a number of measurable indicators.  
A fundamental problem with quantitative analysis in social science is that social 
science is difficult to represent quantitatively. This is also true for political risk, as argued by 
Lindeberg and Mørndal (2002). Political risk is difficult to quantify and the evaluation of it is 
thus made in a more or less subjective manner (Lindeberg and Mørndal, 2002: 3).  This is 
thus one of the main reasons why the majority of social sciences include qualitative research. 
Other issues are associated with statistical probability; according to Brink (2004), political 
risk is not an actuality that can be analyzed and calculated, but rather a metaphor for a wide 
array of other phenomenon. Even though political risk analysis uses mathematically similar 
words such as likelihood, chance and probability, political risk analysis is not mathematical in 
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the pure sense of the term; it involves judgments and not mathematical calculations, according 
to Brink (2004: 117). The uncertainties surroundings the validity of political risk analysis is 
also related to the skepticism related to the field of political risk, referring to the 
multidimensionality of the field of political risk (Brink, 2004: 12). The objective of using a 
quantitative method is to come to a thorough and balanced forecast; it is not a means to 
predict the statistical probability of events (Boshoff, 2010: 30). The main difference between 
the qualitative and quantitative methods of political risk analysis is how the models are used. 
There are, however, common features, such as that both models include micro risks within a 
macro environment; they are generally industry specific; and they exclude risks that are not a 
relevant threat. Furthermore, the models accommodate the specific client and also include 
factors that add to the reliability and validity of the analysis, which again is indicated by the 
specific client’s needs and demands (Jessen, 2012: 23).  
For the purpose of this study a hybrid model is preferred; a hybrid model merges the 
qualitative and quantitative method, which is seen as beneficial as it aids the controlling the 
subjectivity of the researcher. Furthermore, the multidimensional nature of the field of 
political risk calls for research methods that can be adopted across the different fields of 
study, meaning that the research can easily be communicated to audiences in other fields of 
study; furthermore, the companies for whom the analysis is conducted often prefer a 
qualitative method of research. As this research study looks at the oil and gas industry, it is 
only natural to select a method that such companies generally utilize.
4
  
2.5 Conceptualizing Democracy  
The basis of a democratic state is liberty (Aristotle, The Politics). 
In the following sections of this chapter the concept of democracy and the relationship 
between political risk and democracy will be further examined. Democracy has been a 
concept debated for more than two and half millennia. There is little consensus within the 
literature about how to conceptualize democracy, nor how democracy can or should be 
measured, through time and across countries (Coppedge et al., 2011: 247). During the twenty-
five centuries that democracy has been supported, debated, attacked, ignored, established, 
practiced, destroyed and re-established, this process has seemingly created consensus on some 
of its key principles and questions, Robert Dahl argues (1998: 3). The fact that democracy has 
such a long history, Dahl notes, means that democracy has meant different things to different 
                                                        
4
 The Boshoff and Lambrechts (2011) model and methodology used in this research study is explained 
in detail in Chapter Four, sections 4.2 and 4.2.1. 
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people, at different times and places (1998: 3). For instance, the US was classified as 
democratic during much of the 19
th
 and the 20
th
 century, while at the same time it excluded a 
large part of the electorate, as blacks and women were not allowed to vote (Coppedge et al., 
2011: 248). In order to establish what constitutes a non-democratic state or low levels of 
democracy, which is essential for this research study, one needs to establish what in fact 
constitutes a democracy. The term ‘democracy’ in the most basic sense means, “Rule by the 
people”. All usage of the term also presumes sovereignty; arguably a society must have some 
degree of self-governance in order for a democracy to be realized (Coppedge et al., 2011: 
248). Another minimal definition describes democracy merely as a system in which rulers are 
selected by competitive elections (Schumpeter, 1942 in Przeworski, 2002: 12).  
When conceptualizing democracy a distinction should be made between electoral and 
liberal democracies, or minimalistic and liberal definitions. Przeworski (2002: 16) argues that 
a minimal conceptualization, are insufficient, because democracies only endure under certain 
conditions; elections alone are not sufficient for a lasting democracy. In the end the quality of 
democracy is what is important (Przeworski, 2002: 16).  By definition Larry Diamond 
contends that liberal democracies, meaning the broader conceptualization, provide good 
protection of human rights, while electoral democracy by definition does not, as there 
arguably is no inevitable reason that electoral democracy and liberty must go together. There 
are currently many illiberal democracies with human rights abuses and civil strife, which has 
rekindled scholarly interest in liberal autocracies as a better, safer and more stable form of 
government than transitional forms of government (Diamond, 2002: 30). In his celebrated 
1978 book Polyarchy: Participation Opposition Robert Dahl presents a broader definition of 
democracy or polyarchy as he labels it, saying that it:  
denotes a system of government that meets three essential conditions: 
meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups 
(specially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at 
regular intervals and excluding the use of force; a highly inclusive level of 
political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through 
regular and fair elections, such as no major (adult) social group is excluded; 
and a level of civil and political liberties-freedom of expression, freedom of the 
press, freedom to form and join organizations-sufficient to ensure the integrity 
of political competition and participation (Robert Dahl, 1971: 3-20).   
Dahl’s definition of polyarchy encompasses not only the freedom to vote, and contesting of 
the office, but also the freedom of speech and publish dissenting views, freedom to form and 
join organizations, as well as alternative sources of information (Diamond, 2002: 32). Larry 
Diamond states that the liberal democracy requires, firstly, the absence of reserved domains 
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of power for the military and other actors not accountable to the electorate. In addition to the 
vertical accountability of rulers to the ruled, Diamond argues, it requires the horizontal 
accountability of officeholders to one another; this constrains executive power, which aids in 
constraining the executive power as well as aiding the protection of constitutionalism. 
Furthermore, it protects civic and political pluralism, as well as individual and group freedom. 
Freedom and pluralism can in turn be secured only through the rule of law; under the rule of 
law all citizens have political and legal equality, meaning that the state and its agents are also 
subject to the law (Diamond, 2002: 35).  
In order to compare and measure democracy, consensus about the definition is 
desirable but impossible, according to Coppedge et al. (2011: 248). For example, if one 
cannot agree upon what X is, one cannot measure X either. Thus one must be aware what the 
definition adopted encompasses; a too narrow definition of the concept of democracy allows 
for labeling a society such as the United States as democratic, through-out the twentieth 
century and much of the nineteenth century, while large sections of the electorate are in fact 
not allowed to vote. However, Coppedge et al. (2011) argues that a broad conceptualization of 
democracy can be criticized for including factors that arguably derive far from the 
fundamental meaning of the term, “rule by the people  
The independent organization Freedom House is widely known for its annual 
“Freedom in the World” report and “Freedom Index”.5  Freedom House operates with a 
thicker conceptualization of democracy, measuring the level of civil liberties and political 
rights in a country in order to determine the level of freedom in a given country. Freedom 
House argues that by using a broader conceptualization of democracy they are able to 
measure the real-world rights and freedoms enjoyed by individuals within a nation (Freedom 
House 2014b). One of Freedom House’s main objectives is to speak about threats against 
democracy. Freedom House describes freedom as being possible “only in democratic political 
environments where governments are accountable to their own people; the rule of law 
prevails; and freedoms of expression, association, and belief, as well as respect for the rights 
of minorities and women, are guaranteed”. Their publications have been described as an 
“essential source” and “indispensable guide” to democracy’s development (Freedom House 
2014b). One of the fundamental problems with measuring and comparing the concept of 
democracy begins at the level of the definition. For the purpose of this research study, a thick 
                                                        
5 The Freedom House index and methodology will be explained in detail in Chapter Three, sections 
3.3 and 3.3.1.  
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conceptualization of democracy is adopted. Furthermore, a thick conceptualization arguably 
ties in better with what is most commonly perceived as a democratic state, which arguably 
entails more than elections and a multiparty system. Hence Freedom House’s index and 
annual reports provide the basic premise for what constitutes an actual democracy in this 
research study.  
 2.5.1 The link between democracy, autocracy, MNCs, FDI and political risk  
Monarchy is the best type of government because the King is then the owner of the 
country. Like the owner of a house, when the wiring is wrong, he fixes it” (Banfield, 
1958: 26 in Olson, 1993: 567). 
The literature is full of conflicting theories and incompatible empirical results advocating 
either a negative or a positive impact of the level of democracy on the level of political risk 
for multinational companies. In this section the two main positions related to this issue will be 
examined. A currently widely accepted notion is that investing in emerging markets requires 
that so-called “soft infrastructure” is in place (Dunning, 1998; Jensen, 2006; World Bank, 
2002; Jakobsen, 2012). Societies where democracy, the rule of law and bureaucratic 
efficiency is well established minimize the transaction costs for economic actors and hence 
also the scope for rent-seeking opportunism (Levy and Spiller, 1994; Mudambi and Navarra, 
2002; North 1990). On the other hand, when institutions are poorly developed, a society can 
easily become caught in a vicious circle of autocratic uncertainty, deprivation of of property 
rights, high transaction costs, low levels of investment, and low levels of growth and 
development (Heinz, 2000; Hicken et al., 2005; North, 1990). 
 In his 1993 article “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development” Mancur Olson 
presents the concept of “the rational long-term autocratic leader”. Olsen’s theory is based on 
the logic that it is in the interest of a secure autocrat to provide peaceful order and public 
goods that increase productivity. An autocrat
6
 with a long-term perspective on his position 
has an incentive to increase productivity and to extract the maximum possible surplus from 
the society and use it for his own purpose. But an autocrat who expects a brief period in 
power will find that it is in his interest to confiscate as many assets or levy as many taxes as 
possible (Olson, 1993: 567). According to Olson (1993), an economy will generate maximum 
income only if there is a high rate of investment, even though the returns of said investment 
are received long after the investment is made. This means in turn that an autocrat who takes a 
long-term view on his position will try to convince society or investors that their assets will 
                                                        
6
 The term autocrat refers to “a person who rules with unlimited authority, one who has undisputed 
influence on power” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2014).  
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be permanently protected from theft by others, but also from expropriation by the autocrat 
himself. If investors fear expropriation, they will invest less, and this means that in the long-
term the income for the autocrat will be reduced (Olson, 1993: 571). Thus, according to the 
logic of Olson’s argument, it is clearly in the interest of an autocratic leader to provide a 
secure investment climate. The rational autocrat will have an incentive, because of his interest 
in increasing the investment and trade of his subjects, to promise that he will never confiscate 
wealth or repudiate assets. However, as Olson (1993) argues, the promise of an autocrat is not 
enforceable by an independent judiciary or any other independent source of power, as 
autocratic power by definition implies that there cannot be any judges or other sources of 
power in the society that the autocrat cannot overrule. Any dictator could, because of his 
insecure hold on power, take a short-term view; thus the promises of an autocrat are arguably 
never completely credible (Olson, 1993: 571). 
 Democracies, on the other hand, Olson argues, have an independent judiciary and, 
furthermore, electoral challenges can help to guarantee property rights and the security of 
long-term investments. There is typically no reliable contract enforcement in an autocracy, 
unless there is an impartial court system that can call upon the coercive power of the state to 
require individuals to honor the contracts they have made. Individuals need property and 
contract rights protected from violation not only by other individuals but also by the entity 
that has the greatest power in the society, the government (Olson, 1993: 572). Investors favor 
such democratic regimes, because their assets are protected from destructive banditry by 
dictators. Following the logic of Olson’s argument, one can presume that higher levels of 
democracy are associated with higher levels of FDI, because of lower levels of political risk. 
Nevertheless, democracies are not necessarily long-term oriented either; the terms, tenure and 
time horizons of democratic political leaders can arguably be even shorter than those of the 
typical autocrat, and democracies can lose a great deal of efficiency as a result. However, in a 
secure democracy with predictable succession of power under the rule of law, the decision 
and enforcement of individual rights is not short-sighted, which often is the case under the 
rule of the autocratic leader. Thus Olson (1993) argues that capital often flees from countries 
with ongoing or episodic dictatorships (even when these countries have relatively little 
capital) to the stable democracies, even though the latter are already relatively well supplied 
with capital and thus offer only modest rates of return (Olson, 1993: 572). Olson (1993) states 
that the fundamental obstacle for long-run progress in autocracies is the fact that individual 
rights, such as property right and contracts confidence, can never be truly secure, at least over 
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the long run (Olson, 1993: 572). As an autocrat usually has completely unchecked power, and 
thus has the power to change policies, laws and contracts quickly. 
 Jakobsen (2012) argues that MNCs prefer to invest in democratic nations. This is 
primarily based on the notion that risk of ex-post government intervention and policy changes 
are lower in democratic societies than in autocratic ones, but also because the political process 
in democratic countries is likely to be dominated by labor, which benefits from FDI  
(Jakobsen, 2012: 99). Jensen (2003, 2006) also concludes that democratic governments attract 
higher levels of foreign investment. The presumed credibility-enhancing nature of 
democracies is to a large extent based on the fact that there is no unchecked ruler through the 
presence of veto players and executive constraints, such as opposition parties, an independent 
judiciary and a parliament, whereas in an autocratic regime rule is most likely completely 
unchecked (Heinz, 2000; Jensen, 2006; Leeds, 1999). Undemocratic societies often have a 
number of different characteristics that often make them politically riskier than democratic 
societies. Autocratic regimes, even when they seem stable, may hide an underlying instability 
that ultimately leads to sudden and unpredictable change (Bremmer, 2005; Gates et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, Jakobsen (2011, 2012) argues, autocratic regimes worsen the investment climate 
by increasing the likelihood of corruption through giving bureaucrats and local businessmen 
the ability to extract rents from administrative procedures, exploit political institutions often 
tarnished by cronyism, and constrain MNC operations. Another risk that MNCs run by 
investing in such regimes is reputation risks, by increasing the likelihood of NGO and 
shareholder activism, as well as the probability of lawsuits against the company (Jakobsen, 
2012: 103). Reputational risks such as those described here can have a huge impact on 
companies’ operations in a country; however, reputational risks will not be further examined 
in this research study, as the scope of this study limits itself to political risk. 
 O’Donnell (1978) presents an opposing view to Jakobsen’s (2012), arguing that 
investors and autocrats often have a close relationship; as a result of the political leader’s 
interests in the economic profits from FDI, the autocrat protects foreign capital from popular 
pressure for higher wages, stronger labor protection, or less capital-friendly taxation 
(O’Donnell 1978). The augment presented by O’Donnell illustrates that the investor-state 
conspiracy arguably favor foreign capital in highly autocratic societies. Haggard (1990) 
similarly argues that authoritarian regimes may be attractive to MNCs from countries where 
there are strong labor unions, or leftist economic traditions. An autocrat may in some contexts 
even protect property rights instead of practicing banditry, and furthermore, an authoritarian 
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ruler may “give political elites autonomy from distribution pressures”, allowing a broader 
range of economic policy options for the investor (Haggard, 1990: 258). Authoritarian 
regimes do have some policy discretion at their disposal, which enables them to make 
decisions and implement new policies relatively quickly (Leeds, 1999). Li and Resnick 
(2003) note that if an authoritarian leader uses his unchecked power to control wages, 
suppress popular criticism of foreign capital, suppress opposition parties, offer the MNCs 
lavish rates of return and provide reasonable macroeconomic policies, foreign investors can 
benefit from autocracy, at least in a short-term perspective (Li and Resnick, 2003: 203). Firms 
select investment sites based on how well their ownership-specific and internalization 
advantages mesh with location-specific benefits. Host government policies create location-
specific conditions that affect how well a firm can exploit its advantages (Li & Resnick, 2003: 
180). 
 Although the majority of the literature (Jakobsen, 2012; Jensen 2003, 2006; Heinz 
2000; Bremmer, 2005; Gates et al., 2006; Leeds, 1999; Olson, 1993) concludes that 
democracies attract MNCs and FDI, because of the lower investment risks and a more secure 
investment climate, the notion of investing in an undemocratic country is not foreign to 
MNCs. Furthermore, many of the theoretical arguments presented in this section illustrate 
how creating a good investment climate in fact is in the best interest of the autocrat, and thus 
it is arguably not a farfetched notion that investing in a state under an autocratic regime in fact 
does not equal a high political risk level.  
2.6 Conclusion  
The first aim of this chapter was to provide the theoretical framework for the concept of 
political risk, as well as conceptualizing key political risk terms. The second objective was to 
conceptualize democracy, as well as the theoretical framework and debate on how the level of 
democracy affects political risk. This research study sets out to test whether high levels of 
democracy constitute low levels of risk, as the majority of the literature argues. Following this 
logic thus means that low levels or lack of democracy increases the political risks of 
investments. The theoretical and conceptual aspects of the research, which have been 
presented in this chapter, set the framework for the subsequent chapters of the study. The next 
chapter addresses the case of Angola; it will contextualize the oil and gas industry in general 
and in the Angolan context specifically, as well as further explore the issues related to the 
measurement of democracy.  
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 30 
Chapter three: Angola and the Freedom House approach  
3.1 Introduction  
The first objective of this chapter is to contextualize the Angolan case with regards to 
democracy and the extractive industries. In addition, the national Norwegian oil company 
Statoil and its operations in Angola are contextualized. This is done in order to conduct a risk 
analysis of the political risks that face Statoil’s operations within the Angolan context. The 
second objective is to implement the measurement of democracy using the Freedom House 
approach in order to determine the present level of democracy in Angola. This will answer 
one of the two sub-research questions of this study: “What is the level of democracy present 
in Angola?” In order to analyze whether high levels of democracy constitute low political 
risk, it is essential first to establish the current level of democracy in order to build on this 
analysis in Chapter Four.  
Angola emerged from more than four decades of war to become Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
second largest oil producer and third largest economy (Richmond, Yackovelev and Yang, 
2013: 3). The Angolan case has been described as the perfect example of the duality of wealth 
and misery within a country, with an abundance of natural resources and a population living 
in extreme poverty (Le Billon, 2001: 57). The United Nations Human Development Index 
ranks Angola as number 148 out of 186 countries, which puts Angola in the lowest category 
of human development (UN Human Development Index, 2013). In 2002 the Angolan 
Ministry of Planning noted that as a result of the decades of civil war, the “destruction of the 
country’s infrastructures, feeble health and education system, food insecurity, non-qualified 
human resources, disarticulated production, and misdistribution of revenues” have resulted in 
58 percent illiteracy rate among adults, 75 percent lacking basic sanitation, and 65 percent 
having no health care (McMillan, 2005: 158). In the same year oil exports were $7 billion and 
diamond exports were $800 million, so the oil and the diamonds were bringing in about $700 
per citizen. Meanwhile, 70 percent of Angolans were living on half that amount, less than a 
dollar a day (McMillan, 2005: 158). Although the major inequalities and high levels of 
corruption in Angola are not the focus of this study, it is still important to make a note of the 
context that oil companies are operating in. Is the pervasive corruption in fact is a symptom of 
the low level of democracy in Angola? This also ties in with some of the issues raised in 
Chapter One of this study regarding Western companies who choose to invest in countries 
entrenched in corruption, with authoritarian leaders and countless human rights violations. 
These are issues that should be kept in mind when examining the Angolan case, as one cannot 
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detach issues such as inequality, corruption and poverty from the way a country is ruled and 
the risks that such issues can create for oil companies operating within this context.  
3.2 Angola – the historical backdrop  
Angola was ravaged by civil war for some three decades following independence from 
Portugal in 1975. However, the anti-colonial struggles begun years earlier, in 1961, with the 
start of the anti-colonial war. Angola settled into a low-intensity war, mainly fought in the 
peripheral areas of the country, which on the whole did not affect the large urban areas (de 
Oliveira, 2007: 596). The origins of the Angolan conflict had little to do with oil or other 
natural resources. The key causal factors were the nature of Portuguese colonial rule, 
particularly its failure to prepare for a stable transition to independence. As well as the 
development of three rival nationalist movements, each with a different ethno-regional core, 
competing external supporters, and leaderships set on achieving absolute power at the 
expense of their rivals (Hodges, 2001: 7). Hodges (2001) argues that, unlike the main colonial 
powers in Africa, France and Britain, which from the mid-1950s began to prepare their 
colonies for nationhood, the Salazarist
7
 regime in Lisbon regarded its African provinces as an 
integral part of Portugal and thus did not prepare them for independence (Hodges, 2001: 8). 
 In Angola the nationalist camp was divided into three rival factions, the urban 
Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), with a leftist orientation and self-
proclaimed pan-Angolan discourse, attracting support from the country’s second largest 
ethnic group, the Mbundu. The more ethnically based Frente Nacional de Libertação de 
Angola (FNLA) and União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) both 
drew the majority of their support from the large ethnic groups the Bakongo and the 
Ovimbundu. These two factions, UNITA in particular, received outside support from the 
West (de Oliveira, 2007: 597; Hodges, 2001: 8). Despite military weaknesses, the nationalist 
challenge played a vital role in Angolan late colonial politics, pushing the Portuguese 
substantially to alter the nature of their presence and to make economic reforms (Clarence-
Smith, 1985: 194). This meant opening up the previously protected economy, making major 
urban infrastructure investments, and the doubling of the European population. Consequently, 
the economy of the late colonial period was diversified and vibrant, with an annual real 
                                                        
7
 Salazarism as an authoritarian political system in Portugal as well as in Africa, and thus there were 
no democratic traditions in the African colonies prior to the sudden disintegration of the empire in 
1974-75. In the Portuguese colonies of, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, independence followed an 
armed liberation struggle (Hodges, 2001: 8). 
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growth of 4.7 percent between 1961 and 1974, despite the ongoing war in isolated provinces 
(de Oliveira, 2007: 597). 
 The 1974 democratic revolution in Lisbon halted the ongoing development process, 
with the Portuguese deciding to end the fighting in Angola, which led to talks with the three 
nationalist factions and a commitment to decolonization. The 1975 Alvor peace agreement 
between the Portuguese and the three rival nationalist groups soon broke down, resulting in a 
three-way war for the control of the country. This lead to the invasion of Angolan territory by 
Cuban, Zairian and South African troops, each in support of one of the three competing 
nationalist factions (de Oliveira, 2007: 597). The MPLA and its Cuban allies triumphed in the 
capital of Luanda on the day of independence on 11 November 1975 and acquired control of 
the postcolonial state, after 14 years of armed struggle (Heimer, 1979 in de Oliveira, 2007: 
597). Seizing power after defeating the Western-backed FNLA, the MPLA faced substantial 
problems in asserting its legitimacy and sovereignty (Le Billion, 2001: 58). While the FNLA 
had largely withdrawn into exile, resulting in its eclipse as a major nationalist force, UNITA 
continued to its fight against the MPLA’s de facto government, which turned the transition 
into a long-term political and military deadlock (Le Billion, 2001: 58). In addition to the 
international support the MPLA received, the elite in Luanda and abroad prospered from 
growing oil revenues, while UNITA sustained its quest for power from diamond revenues and 
control of populations in the hinterland. A peace accord was finally signed in 1991 and UN-
supervised elections were held the following year, leading to the victory of the ruling MPLA. 
In the presidential race sitting president José Eduardo Dos Santos did not secure enough votes 
for a first-round victory. A second round was never held, because within weeks the hope of 
peace was crushed as UNITA resumed the war after refusing to acknowledge its electoral 
defeat (McMillan, 2005: 157; Le Billion, 2001: 59). 
 In the divisive setting of the Cold War, a deep distrust between MPLA and UNITA 
leaders undermined two peace processes based more on consensus and accommodation than 
international constraints. The subsequent years of warfare led to more devastation than had 
occurred throughout three decades of the independence struggle and Cold War conflict, as the 
bush war turned into battles over the control of the cities (Le Billion, 2001: 59). 
Approximately 500 000 people were killed during the civil war, and between 2 to 4 million 
people were displaced. The Angolan civil war commenced as an uprising against the 
Portuguese colonial rule, but developed into a Cold War struggle between socialism and 
capitalism. By the 1990s ideology was no longer the driving force for the conflict, but it had 
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arguably been transformed into a struggle for Angola’s oil and diamonds (McMillan, 2005: 
158). In February 2002 government forces killed UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, and following 
his death came a renewed attempt at peace. On 4 April 2002 the government and then rebel 
forces of the opposition UNITA signed the Memorandum Complementary to the Lusaka 
Protocol, which put an end to some 30 years of armed conflicts (Roque, 2008: 139). The 
alliances created by the Angolan civil war still play a key role in contemporary Angolan 
politics. This is illustrated in the following sections, which further examine and contextualize 
democracy in Angola.  
3.2.1 Contextualizing democracy in Angola  
Following independence in 1975, the MPLA established a one-party state and the current 
president José Eduardo dos Santos has been in power since 1979. To date there have been 
three parliamentary elections in Angola and only one presidential election (in 1992). The first 
multiparty parliamentary and presidential elections in 1992 gave the MPLA a majority of 129 
out of 220 seats (see Table 1).  
Table 1. Legislative Election Results, 1992, 2008 and 2012 
 1992  
Legislative Elections 
2008  
Legislative Elections 
   2012  
Legislative   Elections 
Party Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats 
MPLA 1,976,940 129 
 
5,266,112 
 
191 
 
4,135,503 175 
UNITA 1,258,103 
 
70 
 
670,197 
 
16 
 
1,074,565 32 
PRS 77,605 
 
6 
 
204,478 
 
8 
 
98,233 3 
FNLA 84,110 
 
5 
 
71,600 
 
3 
 
65,163 2 
Nova 
Democracia 
0 
 
0 
 
77,405 
 
2 
 
13,337 0 
Based on numbers from the National Electoral Commission (CNE, 2014).  
 
As noted in section 3.2, the first round of presidential elections were not conclusive, 
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but a run-off between sitting president José Eduardo dos Santos and his main competitor, the 
leader of UNITA Jonas Savimbi, were never held (Human Rights Watch, 2009: 6). These first 
multiparty elections in 1992 failed miserably. They were intended to consolidate the peace 
and democratization process, but civil war resumed. Another ten years of war followed 
(Amundsen, 2013: 5). The succeeding phases of governance in Angola have been closely 
interrelated with political, ideological and social evolution. The starting point, after 
independence, was the superimposition of a Stalinist political model on the already highly 
centralized and authoritarian political system inherited from Portuguese colonialism. The 
original aim was to establish a strong state, which could fend off and defeat external and 
internal enemies, achieve national unity, and promote social and economic development 
(Hodges, 2001: 43).  
3.2.2 The 2008 legislative elections 
It took sixteen years before the government felt sufficiently secure to arrange new elections. 
In addition, the government repeatedly delayed new elections, arguing that post-war 
reconstruction was a priority and a necessary pre-condition for holding elections (Human 
Rights Watch, 2009: 6). These second elections were held in September 2008. They were 
described as ‘credible and transparent’ but not ‘free and fair’ (Amundsen 2013: 5). As 
illustrated in Table 1, the ruling MPLA secured its position by winning 82 percent of the 
votes, taking 191 out of 220 of the seats in Parliament, almost wiping out the opposition. This 
also meant that the MPLA secured the necessary two-thirds majority needed in parliament in 
order to change the constitution without approval from the opposition (Amundsen, 2013: 5).  
In 2010 the government changed the Constitution by abolishing direct presidential elections, 
implementing the practice that the first person of the party list receiving the most votes in the 
parliamentary elections would become president (Amundsen, 2013: 5-6). Amundsen (2013) 
argues that the constitutional change sharpened the authoritarian character of the regime and 
strengthened presidential rule even further by weakening the basic democratic principle of 
division of powers. Roque (2013) argues that with the 2010 constitutional amendment and the 
de facto attempt to by-pass parliament’s ability to check and audit the executive, President 
dos Santos consolidated his grip on all sectors of society, the economy and emerging political 
forces. Roque (2013: 2) further argues that the constitutional alterations delayed democratic 
transformation by enforcing the president’s control over the state and the division of power.  
3.2.3 The 2012 legislative elections 
It was under the new Constitution of 2010 that the third multiparty general elections were 
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held in August 2012. Once again the ruling party won by a large margin, with almost 72 
percent of the votes and 175 of 220 Members of Parliament, as can be noted from Table 1. 
Although UNITA gained almost 20 per cent of the votes, the results were no surprise, and 
voter turnout very was low (Amundsen, 2013: 12). According to Amundsen’s (2013) the best 
explanation for the outcome of the elections was the extensive oil and gas resources had given 
the patronage politics of the Angolan regime. Hopeful individuals flocked to the party, co-
optations were frequent, and voters, especially in rural areas, understood it was better to vote 
for a party that could ‘bring home the beef’ in terms of government favors to the constituency, 
cash and infrastructure projects (Amundsen, 2013: 12). Roque (2013) describes the 2012 
elections as a “procedural exercise in democracy aimed at imbuing the dos Santos 
government with legitimacy” (Roque, 2013: 6). She further argues that the elections in reality 
had none of the elements of a credible election, as the principles of equality, fairness, 
inclusion, freedom of choice, transparency and integrity were not present. Furthermore, the 
MPLA government, by attempting to engineer the results, confirmed its position as an 
authoritarian electoral regime. The ruling party arguably also distorted the electoral race by 
using its control over media and vast state resources to promote its own agenda (Roque, 2013: 
6).           
 Another interesting issue is that the number of observer missions and the presence of 
international media were significantly reduced compared to the 2008 elections. Two of the 
observer missions that had pointed out irregularities and suggested improvements after the 
previous elections were not present, namely the European Union (EU) and the Pan-African 
Parliament (PAP), with the EU claiming the costs were too high. As a result, only three 
observer missions participated, SADC headed by the former Tanzanian Foreign Minister, 
Bernard Membe, the African Union (AU) led by the former president of Cape Verde, Pedro 
Pires, and the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP) (Roque, 2013: 6).  
Human Rights Watch has criticized the Election Commission of Angola (CMI)
8
 for “failing to 
address major violations of electoral laws, including unequal access of parties to the public 
media and ruling party abuse of state resources and facilities” (Human Rights Watch, 2013). 
                                                        
8
 The CNE was created as a part of the process of democratization in Angola. However, its 
establishment and institutionalization was rather done implemented above by the president, 
government and ruling party in a process of establishing control of elections (and election results), 
rather than as a core demand of the opposition forces. The perceptions of CNE independence still 
vary. On the one hand, critical voices such as Human Rights Watch claim that the CNE, despite a 
more balanced composition than in 2008, “was not able or willing to fulfill its role as an impartial 
oversight body” (HRW, 2013).  
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Furthermore, the CNE hindered independent observations through the massively delayed, 
restrictive and selective accreditation of domestic and international observers. The CNE also 
obstructed the accreditation of opposition officials at the polling stations. According to this 
report, the police failed to act impartially during the election campaign and on several 
occasions arbitrarily arrested opposition activists (Human Rights Watch, 2013). When 
comparing the 2012 and 2008 elections, the 2012 elections were more revealing of Angola’s 
development over the preceding ten years than they were a reflection of rivalry in a flawed 
democratic procedure. While the 2008 elections were an example of autocratic hegemony, the 
2012 polls were a ‘competitive autocratic’ race that the ruling party was no longer able to 
dominate fully. The 2008 elections demonstrated the power and popularity of the MPLA, but 
the 2012 elections exposed its weaknesses (Roque, 2013: 2). It will be interesting to see how 
dos Santos and the MPLA are able to adapt to the growing strength of the opposition in the 
coming years up until the 2016 elections. The following section examines the role of the 
media, civil society, and the judiciary and the division of powers in Angola, and how the 
Angolan regime is affecting other aspects of society.  
3.1.4 The division of power and the judiciary 
The Angolan constitution stipulates that Angola is a multiparty democracy, with a separation 
of power between the judiciary, the legislature and the executive. However, in reality this has 
manifested quite differently (Amundsen, 2014: 176). Amundsen (2014) describes Angola as a 
“hyper-presidential system”, with almost non-existent separation of powers as the President 
of the Republic is Head of State, Head of Government, Commander in Chief of the Armed 
Forces and President of the ruling party. The president appoints and can remove the Vice 
President and the Council of Ministers, the Attorney General, the Governor of the Central 
Bank, generals and commanders in the armed forces, police and security vices, members of 
the judiciary including the Supreme and Military Courts. Furthermore, the president has the 
power to dissolve parliament; however, parliament does not have the power to do the same. 
According to Amundsen (2014), there is also an informal element to the Angolan system, 
which refers to a set of informal mechanisms of presidentialism in Angola. These are just as 
strong as the formal ones, as there is a lack of respect for parliamentary and judiciary 
decisions (Amundsen, 2014: 176). The Angolan judiciary, whose task it is to enforce these 
rights given to the Angolan people by the constitution, fails in its task. The judiciary has been 
described by the U.S. Department of State as “understaffed, inefficient, corrupt, and subject to 
executive and political influence” (U.S. Department of State, 2008). The Angolan constitution 
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and laws provide the individual with legal protection on a wide range of political, economic 
and social rights. However, there is an extensive gap between the rights given to people and 
their actual enforcement (Amundsen 2014: 181). The current situation is to some extent a 
result of the lack of human and technical resources, but mainly a result of insufficient 
government prioritization and political will to maintain an efficient and independent court 
system as the judiciary, just like the parliament, is completely dependent on the presidency 
(Amundsen, 2014: 181).  
3.1.5 Media and civil society 
Another key element that needs to be examined when contextualizing democracy in Angola is 
the role of media and civil society. The government and the MPLA control all media with a 
nationwide reach. The only daily newspaper Jornal de Angola as well as the TV service are 
state-owned and are rarely critical of the government. Private radio stations operate in the 
main cities, but there is minimal independent media outside of the capital (Amundsen, 2014: 
183). The Angolan constitution guarantees freedom of expression, but in reality, Amundsen 
(2014) argues, the state and the MPLA exercise firm, centralized control over both state 
media and private media outlets, made possible by the fact that most of the media outlets are 
owned by individuals or groups with ties to the government or the ruling party (Amundsen, 
2014: 183). Furthermore, the independent media are often subject to harassment, and 
government media have “no real competitors and [are] intrinsically opposed to independent 
voices within the country” (Mendes and Smith, 2006: 26).  Like the independent media, civil 
society organizations (CSOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also face 
incapacitating government restraints. The government has not been willing to acknowledge 
civil society as a political actor and has expressed its dislike for human rights and activism in 
support of open political association (Amundsen, 2014: 183; Amundsen and Abreu, 2006: 
14). Angolan CSOs working on political issues such as transparency, public finance 
management and budgets are few and have few members. Amundsen and Abreu (2006) credit 
this to the hostile working environment for such organizations, in addition to the persistent 
possibility of reprisals from the government (Amundsen and Abreu, 2006: 42–48). However, 
in the last couple of years there have been reports of an upsurge in the number of spontaneous 
anti-government street protests. Arguably inspired by the Arab spring, people have openly 
challenged the authorities. The government’s response has been to deploy armed police, open 
use of violence, arrests and detention without trial (Redvers, 2011). Angola is currently 
experiencing the growing strength of the opposition, civil society and the media. Angola’s 
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new phase of “competitive electoral autocracy” has led to interplay of reforming democratic 
forces, the survivalist regime, the citizenry and elements of the security apparatus (Roque, 
2013: 10). However Alencastro, (2012) argues, the great spectacle of elections must not 
obscure the fact that the political arena of post-war Angola remains significantly 
underdeveloped. If nothing is done to change this, the Angolan elections can become a ritual 
of legitimation for the MPLA, where the opposition plays the role of figurants, the masses 
trade their political passion for subventions and the international community cheerleads 
(Alencastro, 2012: 60). Roque (2013) argues that Angola will reach the stage where only a 
negotiated revolution will be possible. This will come about when the rulers can no longer 
govern and the ruled will no longer accept being governed in the same manner. The catalyst 
will probably be an alignment of several factors: the economic inability to sustain the wide 
patronage network, continued widespread pressure and demonstrations, greater autonomy 
within MPLA groups, and the growing strength of the opposition, civil society and the media 
(Roque, 2013: 10). The growing opposition, in particular the new generation of young people, 
which indeed has shown itself to be a powerful mobilization tool, may be what sets in motion 
mechanisms that may change the current picture. These developments, coupled with the run-
up to the 2016 elections, may prove to be a critical juncture in the current political situation.  
3.3 Measuring democracy in Angola: The Freedom House approach  
The following three sections of this chapter examine the measurement of democracy, in 
particular the Freedom House approach, which is the measurement model of choice for this 
research study. Every year the independent organization, Freedom House, publishes its annual 
report “Freedom in the World”. It is a global report on political rights and civil liberties, 
composed of numerical ratings and descriptive texts for each country. The 2014 and 2013 
editions, which is the reports this study is based on, covers developments in 195 countries and 
14 territories (Freedom House, 2014a). The methodology of the “Freedom in the World” 
report is largely based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and as such the report 
is founded on the premise that these standards apply to all nations and territories, regardless 
of geographical location, religious or ethnic composition, or the level of economic 
development. “Freedom in the World” operates on the assumption that freedom for all 
peoples is best achieved in liberal democratic societies (Freedom House, 2014b).  
As discussed in Chapter 2 section 2.5, there is no scholarly consensus on how to 
define or measure democracy, which again makes the objective of measuring democracy 
elusive. The terms ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ are often used interchangeably, but the two are 
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not synonymous. Democracy can be seen as a set of principles and practices that 
institutionalize and ultimately protect freedom. Though it has proved difficult to come up 
with a precise definition, most observers today would agree that at a minimum the 
fundamental features of a democracy include government based on majority rule and the 
consent of the governed, the existence free and fair elections, the protection of minority rights 
and respect for basic human rights. Democracy presupposes equality before the law, due 
process and political pluralism (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012: 25). According to 
Coppedge (2005), there is a key difference between what he labels “thin”, or minimalist and 
“thick”, or broader concepts of democracy. The “thin” concepts correspond closely to an 
immensely influential approach in the academic literature, that of Robert Dahl’s polyarchy.9 
The Freedom House measure of democracy, based on political rights and civil liberties, can 
be described as a “thicker” democracy measurement.  
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2012 “Democracy Index”, which also rates 
democracy in the world, notes that “at preset, the best known measure is produced by the US-
based Freedom House organization” (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012: 25). The 
“Democracy Index” report, however, opts for an even thicker measurement of democracy 
than Freedom House, arguing that a measurement that reflects the state of political freedoms 
and civil liberties is not thick enough (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012: 26). However 
this underpins the argument that freedom is an essential part of democracy, whether its 
sufficient or not when measuring levels of democracy depends on the conceptualization used 
by the specific organization conducting the ranking. Hence, following the logic of a thicker 
conceptualization, freedom is a necessary cornerstone in a democracy, and as such the 
measurement of freedom can arguably translate into the measurement of democracy.  In this 
research study a thick understanding of the democracy concept is the premise for the research; 
accordingly Freedom House’s “Freedom in the World” report was a natural choice in the 
measurement of democracy. The following sections examine the Freedom House 
measurement model of democracy, as applied to the case of Angola, the scores given, and the 
reasoning behind them.  
3.3.1 Freedom House measurement of democracy 
The “Freedom in the World” report uses a three-level rating system, which includes scores, 
ratings and finally a status of Free, Partly Free or Not Free. A score from 0 - 4 is given to a 
country or territory for each of the 10 Political Rights (PR) indicators and 15 Civil Liberties 
                                                        
9
 See section 2.5 in Chapter Two for Robert Dahl’s definition and conceptualization of polyarchy.  
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(CL) indicators/questions in the analysis. The indicators are designed as questions; a score of 
0 represents the lowest degree of freedom and 4 the highest degree of freedom. The 10 PR 
indicators are grouped into three subcategories: Electoral Process, Political Pluralism, 
Participation, and Functioning of Government. The CL indicators are grouped into four 
subcategories: Freedom of Expression and Belief, Associational and Organizational Rights, 
Rule of Law, and Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights. The highest total score that can 
be given for the PR category is 40, and the highest possible combined score in the CL 
category is 60. The scores from the preceding years are used as a benchmark for the year that 
is under review. A score is usually only changed if there has been a “real-world development” 
during the year that warrants a lowering or raising of the score (Freedom House, 2014b). The 
second level of the freedom House analysis is the rating for each of the two categories of PR 
and CL for a country or territory. The rating is given based on two separate scores from 1-7, 
one for each of the two main categories, and is based on the total score for the PR and CL 
questions. As seen in Table 2 and Table 3, each rating of 1-7, with 1 representing the highest 
level of freedom and 7 representing the lowest degree of freedom, corresponds to a specific 
range of total scores, this is presented in the following section (Freedom House, 2014b).  
Table 2. Political Rights Rating               Table 3. Civil Liberties Rating 
  
 
 
  
                                                                                                  
 
 
 
 
 
(Freedom House, 2014b). 
Each rating in the two different categories corresponds to a different set of characteristics; for 
the PR category these characteristics are outlined and described in Table 4:  
 
 
 
                    Political Rights 
  Total Score PR Rating  
     36-40         1 
     30-25         2 
     24-29         3  
     18-23         4 
     12-17         5 
      6-11         6 
       0-5         7 
                   Civil Liberties  
Total Score CL Rating  
     53-60         1 
     44-52         2 
     35-43          3 
     26-34         4  
     17-25         5 
     8-16         6 
      0-7         7 
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Table 4. Political Rights Characteristics 
1 Countries and territories with a rating of 1 enjoy a wide range of political rights, including 
free and fair elections. Candidates who are elected actually rule, political parties are 
competitive, the opposition plays an important role and enjoys real power, and the interests 
of minority groups are well represented in politics and government. 
2 Countries and territories with a rating of 2 have slightly weaker political rights than those 
with a rating of 1 because of such factors as political corruption, limits on the functioning of 
political parties and opposition groups, and foreign or military influence on politics. 
3, 4, 5 Countries and territories with a rating of 3, 4, or 5 either moderately protect almost all 
political rights or strongly protect some political rights while neglecting others. The same 
factors that undermine freedom in countries with a rating of 2 may also weaken political 
rights in those with a rating of 3, 4, or 5, but to a greater extent at each successive rating. 
6 Countries and territories with a rating of 6 have very restricted political rights. They are ruled 
by one-party or military dictatorships, religious hierarchies, or autocrats. They may allow a 
few political rights, such as some representation or autonomy for minority groups, and a few 
are traditional monarchies that tolerate political discussion and accept public petitions. 
7 Countries and territories with a rating of 7 have few or no political rights because of severe 
government oppression, sometimes in combination with civil war. They may also lack an 
authoritative and functioning central government and suffer from extreme violence or rule by 
regional warlords. 
         (Freedom House, 2014b). 
For the CL category, the ratings corresponding to the different characteristics are described 
and outlined in Table 5: 
Table 5. Civil Liberties Characteristics 
1 Countries and territories with a rating of 1 enjoy a wide range of civil liberties, including 
freedoms of expression, assembly, association, education, and religion. They have an 
established and generally fair legal system that ensures the rule of law (including an 
independent judiciary), allow free economic activity, and tend to strive for equality of 
opportunity for everyone, including women and minority groups. 
2 Countries and territories with a rating of 2 have slightly weaker civil liberties than those with a 
rating of 1 because of such factors as limits on media independence, restrictions on trade union 
activities, and discrimination against minority groups and women. 
3, 4, 5 Countries and territories with a rating of 3, 4, or 5 either moderately protect almost all civil 
liberties or strongly protect some civil liberties while neglecting others. The same factors that 
undermine freedom in countries with a rating of 2 may also weaken civil liberties in those with 
a rating of 3, 4, or 5, but to a greater extent at each successive rating. 
6 Countries and territories with a rating of 6 have very restricted civil liberties. They strongly 
limit the rights of expression and association and frequently hold political prisoners. They may 
allow a few civil liberties, such as some religious and social freedoms; some highly restricted 
private business activity, and some open and free private discussion. 
7 Countries and territories with a rating of 7 have few or no civil liberties. They allow virtually 
no freedom of expression or association, do not protect the rights of detainees and prisoners, 
and often control or dominate most economic activity. 
         (Freedom House, 2014b). 
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The final status corresponds to the final rating given based on the combined scores of the PR 
and CL categories; this produces the “Freedom Rating”, which is the number that determines 
the status of Free, Partly Free, or Not Free, as seen in Table 6 (Freedom House, 2014b). In 
the next section the Freedom Status of Not Free will be further examined in relation to the 
case of Angola.  
Table 6. Freedom Status                            
       Freedom rating 
(Combined average of PR 
& CL rating) 
        Freedom Status  
                1.0 – 2.5               Free 
                3.0 – 5.0               Partly Free 
                5.5 – 7.0                Not Free 
           (Freedom House, 2014b) 
 
3.3.2 The Angolan case 
The following section looks at Angola and the level of democracy in the country according to 
the Freedom House rating, as well as Freedom House’s evaluation of the current situation 
within the two categories of Political Right and Civil Liberties. For PR Angola is given a 
score of 6, and for CL a 5, which gives a combined score of 5.5 and the Freedom Status of 
Not Free, as seen in Table 6, in section 3.3.1. (Freedom House, 2014a: 18).  The following 
section deals Freedom House’s evaluation and description of the current situation in Angola.  
In the category of PR, according to the Freedom House data and evaluation, Angola is 
not an electoral democracy. Freedom House states that the 2012 Angolan legislative elections 
were not free and fair. Furthermore, the National Assembly has little power and 90 percent of 
legislation originates from the executive branch, according to the 2013 “Freedom in the 
World” report. Furthermore, although five political parties make up the National Assembly, 
the ruling MPLA dominates Angola’s party system.10 In May 2012 Angola’s Supreme Court 
blocked the appointment of the new National Electoral Commission (CNE) leader, Susana 
Ingles, as she was seen to be a close ally of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos. André da 
                                                        
10
 See Table 1 in section 3.2.2 for complete overview of party and seat distribution in the Angolan 
parliament.  
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Silva Neto was appointed to the post in June 2012. In the following moth the CNE disallowed 
Angolans living abroad from voting in elections. With respect to the Angolan government, 
Freedom House describes corruption and patronage as pervasive, as well as bribery, which 
often underpins business activity in the country. President José Eduardo dos Santos has 
criticized MPLA members for misallocating significant portions of the country’s oil revenues, 
while the president himself is claimed to be one of the country’s wealthiest men (Freedom 
House, 2013). In December 2011 a report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stated 
that from 2007 to 2010 $32 billion in government funds, which could arguably be linked to 
the national oil company Sonangol, had disappeared and could not be accounted for. Angola 
was ranked 157 out of 174 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2012 
Corruption Perceptions Index. The situation that is described here is what finally makes up 
the final rating for PR in Angola, based on the scores in the four different sub-categories of 
Electoral Process, Political Pluralism, Participation and Functioning of Government (Freedom 
House, 2013).  
For the CL category, Angola scores a 5. According to Freedom House, although the 
Angolan constitution guarantees freedom of expression, journalists are often pushed to self-
censorship as a result of threats of dismissal, imprisonment and prosecution. The state owns 
the main television stations, the national radio station and the only daily newspaper, and 
private media are often denied access to official information and events. Furthermore, in the 
last couple of years, the government has tried to restrict electronic communication. Many of 
the anti-government demonstrations in recent years were organized via social media or SMS, 
which could be one of the reasons for such restrictions (Freedom House, 2013). The 
constitution does guarantee freedom of assembly and association, but these rights are not 
respected in practice. In 2012 authorities continued to violently disperse sporadic 
demonstrations by mostly young anti-government protesters, and to arrest and intimidate 
protest leaders, according to Freedom House. There are hundreds of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) operating in Angola, many of which advocate for political reform, 
government accountability and human rights protections. The government sporadically 
threatens to shut down these organizations. In 2011 authorities restricted the activities of a 
number of local and international NGOs relating to a Southern African Development 
Community summit. The right to strike and form unions is also secured in the constitution, 
but the MPLA dominates the labor movement and there are only a few independent unions. 
The judiciary is subject to extensive political influence, particularly from the executive 
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branch, though courts occasionally rule against the government’s wishes. The president 
appoints Supreme Court judges to life terms without legislative input; the May 2012 decision 
disapproving the government’s candidate for CNE head was a unique sign of judicial 
independence. The courts in general are hindered by a lack of training and infrastructure, a 
large backlog of cases, corruption and conflicts of interest. While the government has sought 
to train more municipal magistrates, municipal courts are rarely operational, leading to the use 
of traditional or informal courts (Freedom House, 2013). The situation described above is 
what finally makes up the final rating for CL in Angola, based on the scores in the indicator 
sub-categories of Freedom of Expression and Belief, Associational and Organizational 
Rights, Rule of Law, and Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights.  
The picture that is painted of the current Angolan situation through the Freedom 
House descriptions, the combined rating of 5.5, which gives a Freedom Status of Not Free, as 
well as the descriptions provided in section 3.2.1, all serve as evidence for the claim that 
Angola is undemocratic. The second sub-research question of this research study, as presented 
in section 1.3 in Chapter one asks: “What is the level of democracy present in Angola?” On 
the basis of the evidence provided in this chapter, the level of democracy in Angola is 5.5 on a 
scale of 1 – 7, which means not democratic or Not Free, according to the conceptualization of 
democracy adopted in this study. This finding thus serves as a premise for the remainder of 
the research study. The following three sections of this chapter examine and contextualize the 
Angolan oil and gas industry, with a particular emphasis on the government’s role and the 
conditions that foreign oil companies operate in. Additionally Statoil’s operations in Angola 
are examined.   
3.4 Contextualizing the oil and gas industry 
“The international companies don’t run the business anymore. The rule-makers are 
now the national oil companies. They drive the business” (J. Robinson West in Blum, 
2005). 
On a global scale petroleum accounts for 15 percent of trade in the world; oil and gas 
production serves to meet nearly 60 percent of the energy consumed globally. The demands 
for increased production are growing, as expanding economies such as India and China 
require more energy to continue their growth. In the coming 20 years 90 percent of the 
production is projected to come from the developing world (Transparency International, 
2011). The multibillion-dollar oil and gas industry can be divided into three areas. Upstream, 
also labeled the exploration and production sector, involves finding and extracting oil 
(Downy, 2009: 62). The midstream sector involves the transportation of crude oil and finished 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 45 
products by ships, pipelines, trucks and so on. The third area, downstream, also referred to as 
the refining and marketing sector, also involves storage. Both the upstream and downstream 
sectors are rather diverse with hundreds of competing organizations (Downey 2009: 74). 
Within the oil industry, the upstream sector, the exploration for and the production of crude 
oil, is the most profitable; however, it is also the sector that is the most prone and exposed to 
political risk (Downey, 2009: 83). 
 The oil industry can be generally divided into two types of oil companies, national oil 
companies (NOCs) and international oil companies (IOCs). The traditional view of the oil 
industry places the IOCs as the lead in production; however, government-controlled NOCs 
are now challenging international firms such as Shell and Chevron in the global competition 
for oil reserves (Al-Kasim, Søreide & Williams, 2008: 18). NOCs and IOCs often join forces 
in joint ventures, as the NOCs in many cases lack the technology, skills and finance that is 
required to develop large-scale projects (Al-Kasim, Søreide & Williams, 2008: 18). The oil 
sector is changing quite rapidly, towards stronger host governments and stronger national oil 
companies.  
3.3.1 Contextualizing the Angolan oil industry 
“The role of the state should be to take that wealth and apply it in ways that will 
benefit the people of Angola … The oil revenues go straight to the state budget, but the 
people see very little benefit” (Pinto de Andrade in Polgreen, 2003).  
The Angolan oil industry was established during the colonial period, and the Angolan oil 
company Companhia de Petroleos de Angola – Petrangol started production in the mid-1950s. 
By independence in 1975 Angola was already an established oil producer, and oil was already 
its most important commodity (Frynas and Wood, 2001: 589). Following independence, the 
MPLA government created the national oil cooperation – Sociedade Nacional de 
Combustiveis (Sonangol). This introduced vast reforms in the oil industry, choosing a 
pragmatic strategy in its dealing with Western oil companies, allowing them to continue with 
their operations but at the same time forcing these companies to form joint ventures and 
production-sharing agreements with Sonangol (Frynas and Wood, 2001: 590). The Angolan 
oil industry entered a new phase of its development in the 1990s, as developments in 
extraction technology opened for exploration in deep and ultra-deep waters for the first time, 
resulting in vast oil findings for Angola. Furthermore favorable petroleum taxation and low 
operating costs prompted much outside interest in Angola’s oil, leading to a development of a 
growing investor diversification (de Oliveira, 2007: 603; Frynas and Wood, 2001: 591). 
Angola rapidly became a hotspot for companies from all over the world such as BP, Shell, 
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ExxonMobil, Statoil, NorskHydro, Petrobras, as well as the Chinese companies CNOOC and 
Sinopec, all intentionally drawn into Angola by Sonangol  (de Oliveira, 2007: 603). By the 
end of the 1990s government interference in the oil industry raised the issue of Angola’s 
attractiveness to foreign investors,
11
 and reduced returns for the oil companies (Frynas and 
Wood, 2001: 591). 
 Angola experienced an “oil boom” from 2002-2008. However, the 2008 financial 
crisis caused a drop in world oil prices, leading Angola to change its natural resource 
management. By 2009 Angola was challenged by growing macroeconomic instability in a 
climate of significantly declining oil price revenue (Richmond, Yackovelev and Yang, 2013: 
4). Richmond, Yackovelev and Yang (2013) describe one of the great challenges for Angolan 
policymakers as turning the resource wealth into development advances. Given a long oil 
revenue horizon and the possibility of finding more reserves, the main challenge in Angola is 
to maintain macroeconomic stability and stable spending levels despite volatile oil revenues. 
Oil revenue is subject to volatility because of prices, production and the institutional setting. 
In addition to shifting oil prices and production quantity, Angola also has recurring problems 
of unpredictable transfers of oil revenues from Sonangol to the treasury. The risk is that what 
is transferred is only what is left after Sonangol’s financial operations. In 2011 oil production 
in Angola comprised 47.5 percent of GDP and oil revenue surpassed 80 percent of Angola’s 
total tax revenue (Richmond, Yackovelev and Yang, 2013: 4). Oil alone accounts for 95 
percent of Angola’s export revenue.12 Angola is thus heavily dependent on oil, which affects 
the economy on multiple levels. In a 2013 report the World Bank highlights some of the main 
challenges related to Angola’s political economy and the oil industry. First, oil exports 
generate inflows of foreign currency, causing the local currency, the kwanza, to appreciate; 
this weakens the competitiveness of the non-oil sector by effectively making Angolan goods 
more expensive for foreign consumers, while foreign goods become cheaper for domestic 
consumers. Secondly, the oil sector and related industries tend to offer the highest returns on 
both financial and human capital, and they consequently attract the major share of domestic 
credit and employ the best-educated and most experienced labor in the country. This further 
damages the competitiveness of the non-oil industries, which must cope with an environment 
of scarce and expensive investment capital and high labor costs for skilled workers. Finally, 
                                                        
11
 The government changed the buying terms of offshore development, making investors lease floating 
production, storage and offloading vessels for offshore oil fields, rather than buying them (Frynas and 
Wood, 2001: 591). 
12
 Angola is the least export-diverse country in Africa, and rivals Iraq as least export-diverse 
worldwide (World Bank, 2013: 5).  
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the revenue generated by the oil sector boosts domestic demand for non-tradable goods and 
services, such as electricity and construction, which increases production costs in the non-oil 
tradable sector (World Bank, 2013: 5). 
In the Angolan oil industry the national oil company Sonangol plays a fundamental 
role in addition to the government. Angola’s management of its oil resources and revenues 
has been and still is subject to criticisms by NGOs and other international organizations, such 
as the IMF and the World Bank. The next paragraph sheds light on the causes of what has led 
to criticism of the controversial national oil company and its ties to the government, and of 
the Angolan government. 
 According to de Oliveira (2007), Sonangol is, on the one hand, “at the service of the 
presidency and its rentier ambitions” as well as “a basic tool for elite empowerment” and, on 
the other hand, it has been “from the very start protected from the dominant both predatory 
and centrally planned logic of Angola’s political economy” and is, therefore is an “island” of 
proficiency thriving simultaneously with the collapse of most other Angolan state institutions  
(de Oliveira, 2007: 595). Sonangol is a modern company, employing thousands of people and 
operating on four continents. In Angola the national oil company has multiple roles: it is an 
oil concessionaire, a regulator of the industry, a tax collector, and a national oil company 
operating both alone and in joint ventures with foreign companies (Amundsen, 2014: 177). 
Sonangol also carries out quasi-fiscal activities. For example, it supplies petroleum products 
to the domestic market at subsidized prices, manages and services public debt, and markets 
the government’s share of crude oil. This has turned the company into a “state within the 
state” (de Oliveira, 2007: 595). In the 1980s Sonangol handled oil-backed loans, which were 
used to finance the company’s development, for the purchase of arms and intelligence 
services, and strengthening the powers of the president. The secrecy of the arms deals and the 
opportunities for bribery kept these operations out of the budget system. Later the IMF and 
the World Bank, amongst others, pressured Angola to reform its practices and subsequently it 
accounting practices did improve (Amundsen, 2014: 177). Nevertheless, the expensive 
borrowing practices still go on, in particular with a six billion US$ oil-backed credit line to 
China,  Sonangol still operates a parallel expenditure execution system (Corkin, 2007; Corkin, 
2011: 15). This suggests that a significant share of government costs is not included in the 
formal budgetary system, and that Sonangol is still instrumental in more suspicious finance 
operations, which has been labeled the “missing billions scheme”. This was noted in a 2011 
IMF report, which revealed an unexplained US$ 32 billion inconsistency in the Angolan 
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government’s accounts from 2007 through 2010 (IMF, 2011). There are two different 
financial methods applied to the petroleum sector in Angola and Sonagol plays a key role in 
both. In the deep-water fields production-sharing agreements (PSA) are common, while 
concessionary systems, based on taxes and royalties, are applied to the older on-shore fields. 
With Sonangol as an intermediary, the Angolan government’s taxation of the oil 
multinationals is high and increasingly advanced. The “government take” from the petroleum 
sector was at 85 percent by 2006, which has been described as “very tough” by the industry 
itself (World Bank, 2006). Hence, Sonangol is a competent and sophisticated national oil 
company, protected and separated from the dominant clientelist logic of Angolan politics. De 
Oliveira (2007) argues that “Sonangol ensures that domestic economic opportunities are 
firmly controlled by those in power, and that independent businesses that could nurture 
alternative poles of influence do not develop and that its “tools and professional expertise ... 
are put at the service not of broad-based prosperity but the enrichment of the few” (de 
Oliveira, 2007: 614) Amundsen (2014) argues that despite Sonangol’s professionalism – or 
rather because of its political purpose – and despite the fact that most Western banks and oil 
companies speak well of Sonangol and report hassle-free interactions with the company, there 
is a low level of transparency. Furthermore, the only information that is available from 
Sonangol’s catalogs, reviews and website are collective figures and washed numbers. 
Comprehensive information on Sonangol-managed social projects funded by “social bonuses” 
and “corporate social responsibility” funds is not available from any open sources, as the 
amounts are subjected to the same confidentiality clause
13
 that restricts the private companies 
from revealing information (Amundsen, 2014: 177). One of the extraction methods used by 
the Angolan state elite has arguably been, as mentioned earlier, the “missing billions” from 
the various oil contracts and signature bonuses in particular. Signature bonuses
14
 are cash 
                                                        
13
 In July 2002 the government passed a Law on State Secrecy, giving itself broad authority to jail 
anyone who released information it regarded as damaging and allowing it to censor international news 
stories that exposed corruption. The legislation also took aim at the publish-what-you-pay campaign, 
providing for the prosecution of the multinational oil companies if they released data on their 
transactions in Angola (McMillan, 2005: 164). 
14
 Signature bonuses are not in themselves a sign of corruption, but an auction design. The problem is 
that signature bonuses often are subject to two kinds of abuses. Firstly, they can be too large relative to 
the royalty rate, and secondly, they can be difficult to trace.  In the pursuit of the best price for an oil 
contract, a government can use two different mechanisms, the signature bonus and the royalty rate. In 
a bidding competition among oil companies, it is essential that the government sets the right mix of 
upfront and ongoing payments. According to the theory of auctions, royalties make the bidding more 
competitive and the total price higher by evening out differences in the bidder’s perceptions of the 
likely value of a contract; so generally, the government should put more weight on the royalties and 
less on the signature bonuses. A higher royalty rate and lower signature bonuses, up to a point, bring a 
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payments made upfront upon signing a contract. Angola has revived large sums from oil 
companies, and for offshore drilling rights in Angola the signature bonuses have typically 
been around US$ 100 – 400 million dollars per drilling contract (McMillan, 2005: 158). The 
problem with signature bonuses can be that if a government with a short time horizon in 
anticipation of an eventual removal wants the cash right away, it might negotiate a higher 
signature bonus and lower royalty rates, thus working to the benefit of the government but to 
the cost of the nation as a whole (McMillan, 2005: 159). McMillan (2005) asks whether 
Angola in fact set signature bonuses too high and royalties too low in order to secure up-front 
payments. In 2001 oil companies reported that following an auction for a deep-water block 
they paid about 400 million US$ up-front in signature bonuses, while the Angolan 
government reported to the IMF that it received US$ 285 million in signature bonuses, for the 
same block. This means that from this particular auction more than 100 million US$ were 
unaccounted for (Amundsen, 2014: 175; McMillian, 2005: 159). McMillan states that even 
though Angolan law requires that the oil revenues are supposed to be controlled by the 
Treasury and the central bank, this is in fact not the case; the revenues are actually controlled 
by Sonangol and the president’s office. Hundreds of millions of dollars are suggested to be 
held in Sonangol accounts in various countries (McMillian, 2005: 159). Although Sonangol 
and the Angolan government have faced an immense amount of criticism, the 2013 World 
Bank report points to some positive developments. According to the World Bank, the 
Angolan authorities have made significant progress in terms of improving transparency and 
accountability of public financial management; however, challenges remain. The government 
has improved collection of and reporting on oil revenues and transfers. This is expected to 
enhance transparency and accountability in the oil sector. The 2013 national budget for the 
first time included quasi-fiscal operations undertaken by Sonangol, which will decrease the 
budgetary uncertainty associated with oil revenue flows. A recent KPMG report also notes 
that the state company has taken steps to increase transparency of its activities after being 
criticized in recent years for not publishing its financial accounts; concerns still remain as to 
the opaqueness of state finances relating to oil revenues (KPMG, 2013: 10). 
                                                                                                                                                                             
larger ultimate payout. The signature bonus is received immediately, however, whereas royalties 
arrive years later (McMillan, 2005). 
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 Angola recently established a sovereign wealth fund,
15
 which has the potential to do 
much to stabilize expenditure against oil price volatility or accumulate long-term savings in 
anticipation of the eventual decline of the oil sector (World Bank, 2013). It is evident that the 
Angolan government is making efforts to create a more transparent oil industry, but as 
illustrated throughout this section, and as noted by both scholars and the World Bank, they 
still have a long way to go before they reach this goal. The current system and institutions that 
are in place in Angola are not fulfilling their task of redistributing the massive Angolan oil 
revenues, and sadly the oil profits still to a large extent end up in the hands of a small elite 
with ties to the government and the MPLA.  
3.3.2 Statoil in Angola  
One of the main objectives of this study is to conduct a political risk analysis for the oil and 
gas industry in Angola, and more specifically for the Norwegian company Statoil. Statoil is 
an international energy company that operates in 36 countries. Statoil is a NOC, and the 
Norwegian state currently holds 67 percent ownership (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy, 2013). Statoil has been operating in Angola’s offshore oil and gas sector since 1991, 
and is currently producing more than 200 000 barrels of oil per day in Angola. Angola is 
Statoil’s most important investment on the African continent, and is the largest contributor to 
Statoil’s production outside of Norway, which makes Angola a key building block for 
Statoil’s international production growth (Hanssen, 2013: 3).  In 2011 Statoil was behind 
more than 10 percent of Angola’s combined oil production. Statoil also received two new 
drilling licenses in 2011, with operatorship, which will mean an increased importance of 
Angola for Statoil in the years to come (Hanssen, 2013: 3).  
Statoil generates income for Angola along three main avenues: indirect taxes, direct 
taxes and profits in oil kind.
16
 The most significant contribution comes from delivering profit 
oil to Sonangol. The value of profit oil is more than three times higher than the taxes paid 
from the same production: approximately 18 billion US$, worth of profit oil in the period 
from 2007 – 2012, as compared to 4.9 billion US$ in paid taxes. The main source of the 
                                                        
15
 Many resource-rich countries have created funds like the one Angola now has established, which 
invests broadly to hedge against fluctuating commodity prices, the biggest being oil-rich Norway’s15 
government pension fund (Polgreen, 2012).  
16
 Oil in kind is another method of commuting royalty. The landowner takes possession of the oil or 
gas produced for the landowner's share of the oil or gas production before the oil or gas is marketed by 
the production company. The landowner can insert a clause in the lease to take royalty either "in kind" 
or "in proceeds." This clause allows the landowner more flexibility and a higher royalty based on 
decisions of the market (Oil-gas-leases, 2006).  
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Angolan government’s take from Statoil’s shares in production is profit oil. Table 7 gives a 
overview of Statoil’s activities in Angola.  
Table 7. Statoil’s activities in Angola 
                              Statoil’s activities in Angola 2007 – 2012 (US$ million) 
Indirect  
taxes paid 
Direct  
taxes paid 
Profit oil  
in kind 
Social 
Investments 
Contractual 
social 
contributions 
Signature 
bonuses 
         4    4 962    17 724       27           48         544 
                                                                                   (Skedsmo, Bade, and Lunde, 2013: 20). 
 These figures do not enable one to calculate Statoil’s actual profits in Angola. Statoil 
does not publicly publish such figures, nor does most other oil companies. This also has to do 
with the complexities of accounting and how investments made in one year may be devalued 
over several years. What can be derived from Table 7 is the level of income Statoil generates 
for the host country, in what form and the level of social investments and signature bonuses 
(Skedsmo, Bade, and Lunde, 2013: 20). Thus, it gives a fairly good picture of Statoil’s 
financial contribution in Angola.  
As an international company Statoil has operations all over the world, including in 
countries that can be considered as high-risk investment opportunities. This was seen in the 
2013 Amenas terrorist attack in Algeria, which illustrates that no company is immune to 
political risks. The attack on the joint BP and Statoil gas field in Amenas also illustrates that 
the oil and gas industry remains a key target for groups seeking to push a particular political 
agenda (Golob, 2013). As a company operating within such contexts, it is essential to 
examine how Statoil conceptualizes such risks. As mentioned, Statoil may also face issues in 
a host country that can raise ethical questions with regard to corruption, human rights 
violations or authoritarian regimes. These are issues that can come into conflict with the 
company’s own values, and as such examining Statoil’s ethical values is important when 
evaluating their role within the Angolan context.  
Statoil defines risk as “a deviation from a specified reference value and the uncertainty 
associated with it. A positive deviation is defined as an upside risk, while a negative deviation 
is a downside risk” (Statoil, 2011: 165). Statoil’s risk management strategy aims “to ensure 
safe operations and to reach our corporate goals in compliance with our requirements”. For 
Statoil, all risks are related to Statoil’s value chain, which represents the value that is added in 
each step – from access, maturing, project and operation to market. In addition to the 
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economic impact these risks could have on Statoil’s cash flow, Statoil also try to avoid health, 
safety and environment (HSE) and integrity-related incidents such as accidents, fraud and 
corruption (Statoil, 2011: 165). According to Statoil’s ethical code of conduct, the company is 
strongly committed to being known for their high level of ethical standards, referring to 
transparency in all of their actions, and they have a zero tolerance of corruption in their 
business. Statoil’s ethical guidelines demand of the company and all working personnel to 
obey all laws and regulations, conduct themselves ethically and sustainably, and to be socially 
responsible. Statoil has a strong anti-corruption policy, as well as an anti-facilitation 
payments policy, and has launched an internal anti-corruption program to combat and hinder 
corruption (Statoil, 2013: 6-7).  
However, Statoil has been frequently criticized in Norway for investing large sums in 
countries with regimes that have little or no respect for human rights or democracy, such as 
Angola, Egypt, Libya, Azerbaijan, Iran and Iraq. These regimes have no real revenue 
distribution policies, and small elite lives in wealth while the majority of the population lives 
in severe poverty (Windheim, 2013: 3-4). This stands in strong contrast to the values and 
principles that Norway stands for as an epitome of a democratic state. Is it right that 
Norwegian companies, in particular a nationally owned company such as Statoil, invest in 
countries where the majority of the people are not able to see the benefits of the oil revenues?  
In an interview with the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten, in January 2014 Knut 
Rostad, Statoil’s media spokesperson, addresses the criticism in email:  
Q: Should Statoil operate in undemocratic and corrupt countries?  
A: “Whether we can be present in a country or not depends upon our ability to carry 
out our obligations and operations in accordance with national legislation, 
international standards and our ethical guidelines. If we can operate according to this, 
we have operations in the country”.  
Q: Many argue that Statoil’s transfers underpin authoritarian regimes, such as in 
Algeria, Angola and Azerbaijan. What do you think about this? 
A: “We report openly about all our payments to governments in countries where we 
operate. We have zero tolerance of corruption, with strict guidelines internally, clear 
procedures and good training of employees. We cannot control how the taxes we pay 
are used in some countries”. 
Q: Can you rule out that Statoil transfers end up in the pockets of a small elite? 
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A: “It is not our job to comment on how a country distributes its own tax revenues. 
Our responsibility is to conduct a responsible business based on our values, national 
legislation and international rules. This applies particularly to transparency, zero 
tolerance of corruption and high standards of health, safety and environment” 
(Author’s translation of Aftenposten, 2014).  
Nevertheless, even though this criticism of Statoil’s operations is significant and 
questions surrounding Statoil’s operations in undemocratic and corrupt regimes should be 
raised, this criticism does not constitute political risk. It is rather reputational risks, for Statoil 
in Norway, or internationally, which is not the focus of this study, as this is criticism that 
hasn’t been raised in the host country. However, issues such as corruption, regime changes in 
term of policy and violent protests are risks that could potentially affect Statoil’s operations in 
Angola. As such, conducting a risk analysis of the industry-specific risks that face oil 
companies in Angola, as well as the company-specific risks that face Statoil, will as such 
establish what the level of these political risks are. This will be examined in more detail in the 
following chapter.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
The first objective of this chapter was to contextualize two broad fields, namely the nature 
democracy and the oil industry in Angola. The second objective was to explore the 
measurement of democracy, particularly the Freedom House approach, and subsequently to 
establish the level of democracy in Angola. The findings in Chapter Three show that Angola 
has low levels of democracy; this conclusion is drawn on the basis of the literature presented, 
the Freedom House rating and the illustration of the Angolan case and context. Establishing 
the level of democracy in Angola serves as the basis of the discussion in Chapter Four. The 
overriding objective of this research study is to test whether low levels of democracy 
constitute high levels of risk; this premise will be explored in the next chapter by conduction 
a political risk analysis with reference to Angola. 
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Chapter four: A political risk analysis of Statoil in Angola 
4.1 Introduction  
The three previous chapters of this research study examined the theoretical foundation, key 
concepts and the Angolan context. The objectives of this chapter are first to present the 
industry-specific risk model on which this study is based; secondly, to apply the industry-
specific risk model to the case presented in Chapter Three; and thirdly, to present the risk 
report based on the analysis that has been conducted. By using an industry-specific model 
when analyzing the oil and gas industry in Angola, as well as the oil company Statoil, the 
analysis will be more precise and relevant, and as such the risk report will be more accurate 
for investors. This research study is based on a definition of political risk that sees political 
risk in relation to a particular industry, as different risks may impact in other ways in different 
sectors. As such, the oil and gas industry need to exhibit a detailed set of factors and 
indicators specific to it in order to analyze the political risk it faces. The risk model used in 
this study was developed by Boshoff and Lambrechts (2011), which was based on sources of 
political risk faced by the extraction industry as defined by control risks and variables relevant 
to the oil and gas industry, as suggested by Alon et al. (2006), Berlin (2003) and Lax (1983) 
The final findings and the answers to the main research question, however, will be addressed 
in Chapter Five. In the following sections the risk model and the methodology behind it are 
presented.  
4.2 Developing an industry-specific model for the oil and gas industry 
Political risk is usually not within the control of the investor and thus the level or degree of 
political risk must be determined before an investment takes place. Finally, the decision to 
invest or not is of one based on profit versus risk. It is also a decision that is affected by the 
market and numerous other variables. This section explores the development of an industry-
specific risk model developed by Boshoff and Lambrechts (2011). The process of selecting 
risk factors for an industry-specific model for the extractive industries is a critical one; in this 
section the reasoning behind the indicators of choice for this specific model is presented. 
 In the development of an industry-specific risk model Lax (1983) argues that the role 
of the model is to refine the list and organize the variables – their relationship, flows and 
consequences – into a useful analytical tool (Lax, 1983: 112-113). Without the model, these 
variables only provide information. For an analysis to be successful, a framework is needed to 
organize this information and put it to work. However, Lax (1983) argues that there are 
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simply too many variables to actually include them all in a risk model, and as such some must 
be grouped together and other disregarded, as is done in regards to this model.  
Control Risks (2009) identifies four main sources of political risk that face the 
extraction industries in particular. Politics and governance (political instability, unclear 
legislation on security of tenure, corruption/poor governance, and changing royalty/tax 
regimes), security (civil unrest/ethnic conflict, kidnapping, insurgency and terrorism, labor 
unrest, and theft and pilferage), reputation and social issues (community opposition/social 
license to operate, artisanal miners, joint venture partner reputation, and human rights), and 
infrastructure and health (HIV/AIDS, disease, lack of transport, and communications 
infrastructure). The sources of political risk such as those described here are often inter-
related, and as such are not easily separated (Control Risks, 2009). Berlin (2003) similarly 
highlights a number of factors that the extraction industry faces, such as current activities in 
the host country that affect the stability of the government (now or in future); the prospect of 
national government changes; past history of nationalization and expropriation; previous and 
present experience of other foreign companies; political activity and trends in the region; and 
the general economic condition of the country (Berlin, 2003: 10). Furthermore, Berlin (2003) 
argues that when looking at political stability, the focus should be on the legitimacy of the 
state authority, which is measured by the ability of that authority to impose and enforce 
decrees; the level of corruption that pervades the system of authority; and the degree of 
political fractionalization that is present. In terms of economic policy, the focus concerns 
indicators such as the degree of government participation in the economy, the government’s 
external debt burden and the degree to which interests groups can successfully obstruct the 
decision-making process (Berlin, 2003: 10). Lax (1983) divides the key variables into three 
broad categories – host political risk, corporate political risk and external/international 
political risk (Lax, 1983: 112-113). The variables presented by Berlin (2003) and Lax (1983) 
were both taken into consideration in regards to the development of the Boshoff and 
Lambrechts (2011) risk model. 
 The model developed by Boshoff and Lambrechts (2011) is based on the principles 
and foundation of the model laid out in Alon et al. (2006). According to Alon et al. (2006), it 
is crucial for any company to conduct risk assessments, keeping in mind the unique industry-
specific micro risks, while also considering general macro political risks. By assigning a 
weight to each critical indicator, a reflection of each company’s specific industry, operational 
location, risk tolerance and general political-economic development is achieved (Alon et al., 
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2006: 639). Ultimately Boshoff (2010) argues that it is the conditions around the particular 
investment and the region and industry under investigation that will affect the importance of 
the weight assigned to the indicators in the model. When conducting a political risk analysis 
specific to the oil and gas industry the analyst either knows who the investor is or does not 
have knowledge of the investor. This changes the type of risk analysis undertaken 
significantly. The Boshoff and Lambrechts (2011) study conducts a risk analysis without 
knowledge of the investor, and as such conducted a phase-one political risk analysis. In this 
research study, however, there is knowledge of the investor and the type of investment, and 
accordingly an assessment of both phases one and two is undertaken. By also undertaking the 
phase two assessment, Boshoff (2010: 57) argues that the analysis can achieve a greater 
depth, having knowledge of the investor, the type of investment and the host country. This 
study thus differs from the analysis done by Boshoff and Lambrechts (2011), as it will use the 
complete model, using the case of Statoil in Angola. According to Boshoff (2010), by 
introducing phase two the analyst take onboard a considerable number of variables, which are 
absent in a phase-one political risk analysis and as such provides a more specific analysis, and 
then provides a more complete picture for the investor as the analysis is tailored to the 
specific needs of the investor. In this study the case of Statoil’s operations in Angola is used 
to illustrate the industry-specific risk analysis for a specific company and phase two of the 
model. The following section presents the political risk model.  
 
4.2.1 The risk model  
The risk model incorporates three types of political risk – host country political risk, company 
political risk and international political risk. Each of the three risk types contains a set of 
factors and indicators, which are listed in the beginning of each sub-section.
17
 In applying this 
model, each of the factors carries a percentage weight out of a total 100 percent across all the 
factors. The analyst weights certain factors higher/lower than others depending on the impact 
that factors have relative to the analysis and the other factors. Through this process the model 
attains a degree of adaptability, which is essential in order to create a successful political risk 
model. A rating score between 0 – 5 is given for each of the factor indicators, based on the 
following index: 0 – no risk, 1 – nominal risk, 2 – low risk, 3 –medium risk, 4 – high risk, 5 – 
extreme risk.  The sum of each factor’s indicators is multiplied by the percentage weight 
assigned to that factor and divided by the sum of the highest possible rating score for all 
                                                        
17 A simplified graphical presentation of the full model can be viewed in Appendix A.  
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indicators of that factor, resulting in a weighted factor score. The next step is adding all the 
highest possible scores of the included indicators of a factor (Boshoff and Lambrechts, 2011: 
4). The sum of the weighted factors scores provides an overall political risk rating score 
(OPRR) for the country or region under investigation. The OPRR determines the investment 
and the political risk indication of the country under assessment. The focus of this study is the 
OPRR and not separate ratings of the six factors, since the research will rely on an overall 
political risk rating. The OPRR is evaluated as follows: the higher the rating, the greater the 
political risk the investor and the investment faces, as described in Table 8 below. 
 
Table 8. Scale for investment and political risk indication 
Rating Investment indication Rating  Political risk indication 
0-10 Highly advisable 0-20 Nominal  
11-20 Advisable   
21-30 Very low risk  21-40 Low 
31-40 Relatively low risk    
41-50 Low to moderate risk  41-60 Medium 
51-60 Relatively moderate risk   
61-70 Moderate to high risk  61-80 High 
71-80 Relatively high risk   
81-90 Inadvisable 81-100 Extreme 
91-100 Highly inadvisable   
                (Boshoff and Lambrecthts, 2011: 6). 
4.2 Political risk analysis of the Angolan case 
The following sub-sections examine the six factors: political, economic, societal, petroleum, 
company political risk and international political risk, as well as the subsequent indicators. 
The factors and the factor indicators that are measured will be outlined at the beginning of 
each of the following sub-sections. At the beginning of the description of each indicator the 
value awarded that specific indicator is identified, and the sub-section will conclude with a 
rating of that factor. However, each factor will not be assigned an individual risk factor rating, 
since the objective of this study is an overall risk rating. The following risk report will 
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provide information that be used by an existing investor in the Angolan oil and gas industry. 
The results can also be used in the early stage in the decision making process for other 
investors, as the analysis also will provide useful insight about the extractive industry in 
Angola in general. What is presented in the sub-sections below is micro in its scope as in 
concerns a specific industry within a specific region and one company in particular.  
4.2.1 Political (host country political risk) 
In this sub-section the following indicators will be examined; regime/political stability, war 
and security, repatriation restrictions, corruption/poor governance, unclear legislation/security 
of tenure, and investment constraints.  
Regime/Political Stability (4): Angola is ranked as Not Free by the annual Freedom 
House “Freedom in the World” report (Freedom House, 2014a). The Economist Intelligence 
Unit Democracy Index labels Angola undemocratic and ranks Angola within the category of 
Authoritarian Regime
18
 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012: 7). Angola is a constitutional 
multiparty democracy; however, in reality this has translated very differently. Angola is 
described as a “hyper-presidential” system, with few to no checks and balances, and very 
limited separation of powers (Amundsen, 2014: 176). Since independence in 1975 there have 
been three parliamentary and one presidential election in Angola, none of which has been 
deemed free and fair. The majority of the media are either controlled or owned by the 
government or the MPLA, and independent media are very limited (Amundsen, 2014: 183). 
The media face a broad range of restrictions that hamper the right to free expression and 
encourage self-censorship. The state media and a number of private media owned by senior 
officials are ruling party mouthpieces in which censorship and self-censorship are common 
(HRW, 2013: 2). Angola is experiencing a strengthening of the opposition, which was 
somewhat mirrored in the 2012 elections. Arguably inspired by the Arab Spring, there has 
also been a clear upsurge in anti-governmental protests by Angolan youths. However, these 
protests by a small number of people have been met with violent repose by the regime, with 
arrests and following trails. The regime responded with a military blockade to new 
demonstrations in September 2011 demanding the release jailed of 18 youth leaders, while the 
police attacked journalists to stop media coverage of the situation (Morais and Moreira, 
2011). Although Angola’s regime is classified as authoritarian, it is still a stable regime; 
however, its legitimacy is questionable. With the second longest sitting president on the 
African continent, who seemingly is not looking to step down in the immediate future, the 
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regime is stable for the time being. An authoritarian leader with a long time horizon does not 
necessarily have a negative effect on the investment climate.
19
 However, dos Santos’s 
succession plans and the positioning of his deputy, Manual Vicente, are expected to raise 
tensions during the current presidential term. The planned 2016 elections will be the next 
opportunity for the opposition to challenge the presidency. A potential regime change has a 
great potential to affect the extractive industries, as this most likely would have an impact on 
how the extractive industry is managed. The opposition was seen as gaining ground during 
the 2012 elections; however, the likelihood of a regime change even with an election victory 
is not great. The main opposition party, UNITA, however, is still struggling to change its 
former guerilla image among the population, whose priority is to preserving peace. Near-term 
risk for political destabilization recently diminished with the relatively smooth passage of the 
August 2012 election, despite the violent run-up. Moreover, UNITA’s renewed urban 
campaign might lead to an increase in street protests. In the long run the growing 
independence of civil society groups, progression in competitive politics, as demonstrated by 
the significant number of votes for a split-off opposition party, and President dos Santos’s 
succession make it likely that the MPLA’s hegemony will decline. The indicator is 
accordingly awarded a value of 4, high risk. 
War and security (2): Emerging from nearly three decades of civil war, instability and 
conflict, after the peace in 2002 Angola has to a large extent been stable. In recent years, 
however, there have been a growing number of demonstrations,
20
 particularly by young 
people calling for the resignation of President dos Santos. Political violence is not a 
substantial risk in most of Angola. However, there have been some incidents in the province 
of Cabinda, a small exclave of Angola separated from the rest of the country, which is calling 
for independence. Cabinda produces an estimated 500 000 barrels a day; this amounts to 
about a third of Angola’s total oil exports. Separatist groups such as Front for the Liberation 
of the Enclave of Cabinda have been known to kidnap oil workers and use acts
21
 of violence 
in order to draw attention to their cause; however, the likelihood of such acts is low. The 
Angolan government does have a heavy military presence in Cabinda, which is necessary to 
                                                        
19
 See section 2.5.1 Chapter Two for the “rational long-term autocratic leader” argument presented by 
Olson (1993).  
20
 See sub-section 4.2.3 Societal for a more detailed description of these demonstrations.  
21
 In 2010, when Angola was hosting the Africa Cup of Nations, separatist gunmen opened fire on a 
bus carrying Togo's soccer team, killing several people on board (VOA, 2012). In November 2010 a 
convoy carrying Chinese mine workers contracted by Sonangol was attacked and several miners were 
killed (BBC, 2010).  
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suppress rebellion, according to the government (BBC, 2010; VOA 2012). However, such 
incidents are not frequent and as such do not pose any short- to mid-term risk; the indicator is 
thus given a value of 3, which indicates a medium risk level.  
Repatriation Restrictions (3): A foreign investor in Angola has the right to transfer profits and 
dividends abroad, as well as amounts related to the investment made. The minimum amount 
for foreign investments is US$ 1,000,000 in order to benefit from taxation incentives and to 
be able to repatriate profits. In order to exercise this right the investor is required to have 
proof that the investment was made and that taxes due were paid, as well as obtaining a 
capital export license and complying with the conditions set out in this license given by the 
National Bank of Angola (MLGTS, 2012: 8).  There are minimum periods, however, counting 
from the effective implementation of the investment, that the investor must comply with in 
order to repatriate profits and dividends, which depend on the amount invested on the location 
where the investment is to be carried out. Investments in the oil industries are governed by 
special regimes and require prior approval from the Angolan Central Bank and the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Sonangol (KPMG, 2012-2013). The rules regarding repatriation are 
complicated for a company unfamiliar with the process; however, evidence of oil companies 
not being able to repatriate earnings has not been found and as such the risk related to this is 
seen as 3 – medium.  
Corruption/Poor Governance (4): Angola has emerged from almost 30 years of civil war and 
instability, but the country still continues to struggle with major challenges of weak 
governance and widespread corruption. Angola ranks as number 153 of 177 countries on 
Transparency International’s global transparency scale (Transparency International, 2013). 
This rating indicates that Angola is significantly corrupt and in fact among the most corrupt 
countries in the world. There are varying forms of corruption in Angola; petty bribery is 
widespread and public servants regularly ask for bribes. According to the U4 Anti-Corruption 
Resource Center, inefficient government structures and an obscure regulatory system 
combined with low civil-service salaries offer many opportunities for rent seeking. Grand 
corruption scandals in Angola often involve MNCs and top-level local and foreign officials 
(U4, 2010). There are some strong anti-corruption laws, but the institutions to enforce these 
laws are weak. Without institutions to enforce the laws and, more importantly, break the 
political hold that the presidency and Sonangol have over the country, increased transparency 
and real democracy will not be possible (Ramos, 2012: 16). One of the main issues in terms 
of transparency is linked to public management of Angolan oil wealth. In the Angolan 
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economy, where oil export revenues accounts for around 86 percent of public revenues, the 
government keeps oil accounts, revenues, expenditures and contracting procedures hidden to 
a large extent. Furthermore, the relationship between the authorities and Sonangol is both 
secretive and complex. The majority of the Angola oil revenues flow through Sonangol; these 
revenues feed what Ramos (2012) describes as a vast patronage system. This patronage 
system, run by President dos Santos, has kept the ruling MPLA party and the government in 
check by rewarding elite public officials, family members and the military (Ramos, 2012, 14). 
Sonangol does publish audited annual financial statements on its website, but while there is 
increasingly more information available, this has not necessarily led to increased transparency 
as arguably the information released by Sonangol, and the Ministries of Petroleum and 
Finance is not consistent, comprehensive, reliable or independently verified (Ramos, 2012: 
14). Furthermore, there have been incidents where what is reported by Sonangol is not 
consistent with the numbers reported by the oil company, as in the 2010 incident with the 
“missing millions”22 (HRW, 2012). Corruption is widespread in Angola, and with most of the 
foreign companies in the country being involved in the extractive industries, where the 
corruption arguably is the most pervasive, oil companies are the most at risk of being 
involved in corruption. The major corruption scandals are often tied to “lost” sums of money, 
related to signature bonuses and so on, which is directly linked to the payments of foreign oil 
companies, and as such this is clearly an area where more transparency from the oil 
companies, Sonangol and the Angolan authorities is needed. The risk of corruption is as such 
ranked as 4 – high.  
Unclear Legislation/Security of Tenure (4): There are contractual risks involved for MNCs 
investing in Angola. On the World Banks’s Doing Business 2014 survey, Angola ranks 187 
out of 189 economies in the survey on the variable of the “ease of enforcing contracts” (Doing 
Business, 2014). According to the Doing Business report, contract enforcement in Angola 
takes 1296 days, costs 44,4 percent of the value of the claim and requires 46 procedures. 
Angola’s ranking is as such very low compared to the regional average for Sub-Saharan 
Africa, which would be a ranking of 123 (Doing Business, 2014: 82). As such, companies 
seeking to establish themselves in Angola should familiarize themselves with the difficulties 
related to contract enforcement. One of the key issues is that, even though laws are in place, 
                                                        
22
 In December 2011 the IMF issued a report that highlighted an unexplained US$ 32 billion 
discrepancy in the Angolan government’s 2007- 2010 fiscal accounts linked to Sonangol’s quasi- 
fiscal activities. This figure amounts to a quarter of Angola’s gross domestic product (HRW, 2012). 
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the legislation is complex and not properly enforced as the judiciary lacks independence and 
the mandate to actually enforce the laws. Hence there is a considerable amount of risk tied to 
this indicator, as the rule of law is particularly weak. A rating of 4 is thus awarded.   
Investment Constraints (4): Angola is generally known as a difficult country to invest in, also 
when compared to the rest of the sub-Saharan region. In the World Banks’s annual Doing 
Business 2014 survey, Angola ranks as 179 out of 189 in terms of overall ease of doing 
business. In May 2011 a new private investment law altered the benefits and incentives 
available for investors. The minimum size requirement to qualify for incentives was increased 
from US$ 100,000 to US$1 million. Furthermore, investors must enter into an investment 
contract with the Angolan state, represented by the National Agency for Private Investment 
(ANIP), which will establish the conditions for the investments as well as the incentives 
granted. Angola’s private investment law expressly prohibits private investment in the areas 
of defense, internal public order and state security; in banking activities relating to the 
operations of the Central Bank and the Treasury; in the administration of ports and airports; 
and in other areas where the law gives the state exclusive responsibility. Investment in the 
petroleum, diamond and financial sectors is governed by sector-specific legislation (U.S. 
Department of State, 2013). The World Bank Doing Business report identifies Angola as one 
of the most time-consuming countries surveyed for starting a business. Launching a business 
typically requires 184 days, compared with a regional average of 80 days. In 2003 the 
government established the “Guichê Único” or one-stop shop, under the Ministry of Justice, 
bringing together representatives of various ministries in one place in an effort to simplify and 
speed up company registration time. However, the Ministry of Justice lacks authority over the 
other government ministries and the process remains slow. There is no formal discrimination 
against foreign investment, but Angolan or companies familiar with the bureaucratic and legal 
complexities of the business environment hold an advantage. The Promotion of Angolan 
Private Entrepreneurs Law gives Angolan-owned companies preferential treatment in 
tendering for government contracts for goods, services and public works. Furthermore, only 
firms with a majority Angolan stake can benefit from the loan guarantees, generous terms, 
and subsidized interest rates of the newly implemented US$ 1.6 billion fund to support micro, 
small and medium-sized businesses (U.S. Department of State, 2013). The aspect of time, as 
well as general ease of doing business, alters the risk of investment constraints for MNCs 
without an Angolan partner. “The business environment remains one of the most difficult in 
the world. Investors must factor in pervasive corruption, an underdeveloped financial system, 
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poor infrastructure and extremely high on-the-ground costs” (U.S. Department of State, 
2013). As a result investment constraints will be ranked as a 4 – high risk.  
Final political factor score: 17,5 out of a 25 percent weighed factor score of the overall risk 
model.  
4.2.2. Economic (host country political risk) 
In this sub-section the factor of economy is examined, the following indicators is 
investigated; economic performance, balance of payments, creditworthiness, currency 
convertibility, energy vulnerability, public/private sector mix, and the current account deficit.  
Economic performance (2): As a resource-rich developing country, Angola’s fiscal policies 
are vital for growth. The Angolan authorities have taken steps to improve the heavy resilience 
on oil revenues in the economy since the start of the global financial crisis; however, 
according to the World Bank, there remains considerable room to strengthen the fiscal policy. 
Angola’s level of public investment is very low compared to other countries in the region 
(World Bank 2014c). Angola’s strong public debt profile and the revenue boost provided by 
the recovery of the oil sector offer a valuable opportunity to expand development spending 
and attract greater private sector investment in the non-oil economy (World Bank 2014c). 
Angola’s economic growth as measured by gross domestic product (GDP) slowed down in 
2013. Real GDP growth was at 4.1 percent in 2013, a decrease from 5.2 in 2012 (World 
Bank, 2014c). The current GDP per capita is 5,668 US$, and according to the forecasts by the 
World Bank, Angola will experience growth
23
 in the years to come, a growth that is higher 
relative to the growth predicted for the Sub-Saharan region in general (World Bank, 2014a). 
Angola has experienced a steady decline in inflation levels in recent years; it is currently at 
8.8 percent, which is high, however, it is improving (World Bank, 2014). Furthermore steps 
are being taken to diversify the economy and minimize the heavy reliance on oil. Coupled 
with the expected growth in GDP, the overall short- to mid-midterm Angolan economy is 
looking promising, and a rating of 2 is given. 
Currency (3): The Angolan National Bank (BNA) has focused on stabilizing the nominal 
exchange rate. With the downward trend in inflation over the last few years – however, it is 
still high – the monetary policy has focused on stabilizing the kwanza. To maintain stability 
of the exchange rate, the BNA increased their interventions in the foreign exchange market. 
The increased foreign currency inflows through 2010-2011 as a result of the recovery in oil 
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 Expected GDP forecast for Angola is estimated at 5.2 percent for 2014; 6.5 percent for 2015; 6.8 for 
2016 (World Bank, 2014a).  
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export earnings saw increased pressure on the exchange rate. In response, BNA increased 
their open-market sales of kwanza, boosting international reserves (World Bank, 2013: 5). 
KPMG’s Angola report evaluates the currency risk in Angola as stable, as it is stable against 
the US dollar, underpinned by the strength of the current account position. However, the 
outlook would change in the event of a sharp dip in oil prices (KPMG, 2012-2013: 16). In the 
short to medium term this is not a risk, but it can potentially become a risk, hence a rating of 3 
is given.  
Balance of payments (2): Following the global economic crisis and the decrease in oil 
production and prices in 2008-2009, the rising production volumes and recovering oil prices 
have now pushed the trade surplus to above the levels prior to the economic crisis. Angola 
relies heavily on imports of processed fuels and imported food. Strong growth in domestic 
consumption and construction activity has increased the demands for imports, narrowing the 
current account surplus (World Bank, 2013: 5). Angola’s current account (2012) was 
estimated to have a surplus of US$7.5 billion, which is 6.7 of percent of GDP, which is 
decline from 2011, when the surplus was US$11.3 billion. The narrowing current account 
surplus is mainly explained by developments in the trade balance. Angola’s fiscal balance is 
strongly correlated with the current account balance. With oil revenues accounting for over 80 
percent of all government revenues, fluctuations in the current account are driven by changes 
in domestic savings. This was particularly true in 2008-2009, when Angola’s savings rate 
plunged from about 27 percent of GDP to just 6 percent. Savings have recovered since then, 
but at 20 percent of GDP in 2012 they remain below their pre-crisis level. However, the 
recovery in overall savings has been primarily the result of an increase in public savings as 
the government returned the budget to surplus (World Bank, 2013: 16). In addition to this, the 
Angolan government established a sovereign wealth fund in 2012. The newly created 
sovereign wealth fund is assessed to act as a buffer and reduce the country’s vulnerability to 
oil price falls (PWC, 2012: 25; EKN, 2013: 3). This can be regarded as a positive 
development, but the real effects of this remain to be seen. A rating of 2 is awarded the 
indicator.  
Creditworthiness (3): Angola’s creditworthiness is evaluated as BB- by the credit rating 
agency S&P. This rating indicates that Angola is “less vulnerable in the near-term but faces 
major ongoing uncertainties to adverse business, financial and economic conditions” (S&P, 
2014). The credit rating company Fitch also gives Angola a BB rating, which labels Angola 
as “speculative”; this indicates the following about Angola’s creditworthiness: “ratings 
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indicate an elevated vulnerability to default risk, particularly in the event of adverse changes 
in business or economic conditions over time; however, business or financial flexibility exists 
which supports the servicing of financial commitments” (Fitch, 2014). As described by 
KPMG, “Corruption, mismanagement, opacity in the use of public resources and political 
uncertainty – resulting mainly from the presidential succession issue – pose risks to sovereign 
creditworthiness” (KPMG, 2012-2013: 16). The risks related to this are evaluated as stable for 
the time being and the indicator rating is 3 – medium risk.  
Currency convertibility (3): A Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) was established in August 
2011 to oversee Angola’s overarching monetary policy. This committee is responsible for 
monetary policy operations, including the key task of setting the interest rate on overnight 
loans in the domestic money market. The establishment of the MPC was accompanied by an 
expansion in monetary policy instruments; in particular, the BNA is now able to augment the 
management of the domestic money supply with instruments including reserve requirements, 
currency exchanges and an expanded array of open market operations (World Bank, 2013: 5). 
Short- to medium-term risk is evaluated as 3 – medium, because of the government’s more 
recent efforts in controlling the development of this indicator.  
Energy vulnerability (4): The oil sector remains the driving force of the Angolan economy, 
and the rising oil production coupled with high oil prices led to a recovery of growth in 2012. 
Oil currently accounts for 46 percent of Angola’s GDP and 96 percent of its exports (World 
Bank, 2013: 1). Angola’s strong reliance on oil affects the economy in numerous ways. First, 
oil exports generate inflows of foreign currency, causing the kwanza to appreciate; this 
undermines the competitiveness of the non-oil sector by effectively making Angolan goods 
more expensive for foreign consumers, while foreign goods become cheaper for domestic 
consumers (World Bank, 2013: 5). Non-oil GDP is increasing as a result of developments in 
the electricity sector and the recovery of the agriculture sector following the drought 
experienced in recent years, which heavily affected agriculture output. GDP growth is 
expected to accelerate in 2014 as oil production recovers from the global economic crisis. The 
2014 budget is expansionary, with capital expenditures expected to increase by about 3 
percentage points of GDP to about 13% of GDP. It outlines expenditures of US$ 55.4 billion 
(41.9% of GDP), with the broad aim of helping to diversify the heavily oil-dependent 
economy and boost job creation (World Bank, 2014c). The extractive industries are by and 
large the most important in Angola. Given the reliance on the export earnings from the 
dominant oil industry, most of the economic activity in Angola is related to this sector. Oil 
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exports will remain the country’s dominant source of foreign income in the coming years; 
however, the Angolan government is pursing plans to diversify the economy in other sectors 
through public investment programs in industries such as mining, construction and mineral 
extraction diversification (PWC, 2012: 27). Angola is highly dependent on oil revenues, 
which makes the country very vulnerable to changes in the oil price, and this makes Angola 
energy vulnerable and the risks related to this are rated as 4 – high.  
Public/private sector mix (3): There are many challenges that face the private sector in 
Angola; some have been mentioned earlier under economic performance indicator. In addition 
to this, Angola’s poorly developed financial sector, the banking sector, has grown rapidly in 
recent years, yet access to financial services remains very limited (Jover, Pinto and Mechand, 
2012: 18). Another key constraint on private sector participation in the economy is labor 
market inflexibilities, shortage of skilled labor and the difficulties to hiring expats, and a 
weak and fragmented legal system. The law offers basic protection for bureaucratic and 
administrative disputes, but is a costly and complex process. Firms have a relatively low 
confidence in the courts, which are perceived as partial, corrupt and lacking in enforcement 
capacity. According Jover, Pinto and Mechand (2012), the constraints described obstruct 
entry, while competition in the local economy encourages informality and feed rent-seeking 
practices. Because bureaucratic and political barriers remain significant for the private sector, 
Angolan companies familiar with the bureaucratic and legal complexities of the business 
environment hold an advantage over foreign companies. Foreign companies seeking to do 
business in Angola are often recommended to find a local partner. However, finding the right 
local partner is not easy, as the element of corruption plays a role here as well (Jover, Pinto 
and Mechand, 2012: 19). But while Angola is a difficult environment in which to do business 
for a private investor, this should be weighed against the significant investment opportunities. 
The complexity of the investment climate does not in itself pose a risk, but companies need to 
be aware of this in order to avoid this becoming one. The risk is rated as a 3.  
 Current account deficit (2): Angola’s vast oil exports have created a surplus in the current 
account balance. However, the high pace of growth and investment in the country require 
major imports as very little production takes place within Angola. This will lead to the current 
account surplus shrinking and eventually turning into a deficit. However, the current account 
deficit is estimated to remain modest, as Angola will continue to be a major oil exporter 
(EKN, 2013: 3). As such there is little to no current risk related to this indicator – 2.  
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Final economic factor score: 25,5 out of a 20 percent weighed factor score of the overall risk 
model.  
4.2.3 Societal (host country political risk) 
In this sub-section the following social indicators are explored; internal violence, civil and 
labor unrest, homogeneity, ethno-linguistic/racial/national, ethnic conflict, community 
opposition/social license to operate, standard of living, and environmental activism.  
Internal violence (4): In recent years there has been an upsurge in the number of 
demonstrations as well as episodes of violence in the capital and other major cities. Youth and 
civil society movements inspired by the Arab spring but without any political affiliation 
repeatedly call for freedom of expression and remedies for social injustice, and expressed 
growing disillusionment with the MPLA’s failure to use the oil wealth to benefit its citizens 
instead of sustaining patronage. In May 2012 a group of former Angolan soldiers from all 
former armed movements staged new demonstrations, protesting unpaid pensions and benefits 
(HRW, 2013: 3). The key issue with regard to these demonstrations has been the authorities’ 
response, even to small-scale peaceful protests, as the government has not hesitated to use 
excessive force, arbitrary arrests, unjust trials, and intimidation of journalists and other 
observers. In addition to this, the authorities created distress among the Angolan population 
by alleging that the protests could result in civil war and must thus be stopped. According to 
Human Rights Watch, the key perpetrators in regards to this have been groups of armed 
individuals, which act with complete impunity and appear to be civilians dressed as security 
agents. In the months leading up to the elections in 2012, attacks, threats, abductions, and 
forced disappearances, against the opposition activists and youth protestors leaders by these 
civilian dresses security agents increased in what appeared to be a systematic matter (HRW, 
2013: 3). As there in general has been an increase of internal violence, in a country where 
speaking out against the government publicly has not been common, particularly in reference 
to the 2012 elections, the risk of there being an increase of such episodes in relation to the 
next elections is high, which gives a indicator score of 4 - high.  
Civil and labor unrest (3): Angola’s labor laws provide substantial protection and benefits to 
workers, including the right to strike (KMPG, 2012-2013: 32). Yet with reference to the 
indicator of labor unrest, the authorities’ reaction to demonstrations on 27 May 2012 by 
former presidential guards who were claiming unpaid salaries clearly illustrates the 
authorities’ views on labor demands. Violent attacks by law enforcement, and the abduction 
of two demonstration organizers whose whereabouts are still unknown, was the result. The 
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police have rejected their families’ requests to investigate the case, nor have the police 
followed up other complaints filed by protesters against their violent aggressors (HRW, 2013: 
4). Again as noted in the two previous sub-sections, laws are in place, but the enforcement of 
them judicially as well as by law enforcement agencies is clearly questionable. The risk is 
accordingly rated as 3 – medium risk.  
Homogeneity (2): The Angolan population is composed of different ethnic groups,
24
 but this 
is not the root of any particular issues as will be seen in the next indicator section. In terms of 
religious beliefs, the majority of the population practices indigenous beliefs or some form of 
Christianity (CIA World Fact Book, 2014). However, the Angolan Muslim minority has 
recently accused the authorities of banning Islam after shutting down most of the mosques in 
the country, and there have been reports of violence against women wearing the veil. The 
Islamic Community of Angola (ICA) claims that eight mosques have been destroyed during 
the past two years, and anyone who practices Islam risks being found guilty of disobeying 
Angola’s penal code (Cabeshe and Smith, 2013). Under Angolan law a religious group needs 
more than 100,000 members and to be present in 12 of the 18 provinces to gain legal status. 
There are only an estimated 90,000 Muslims in Angola’s population. Rafael Marques de 
Morais, an Angolan journalist and political activist, claims that “I’ve seen an order that says 
Muslims must destroy the mosques themselves and clear away the debris, or they will be 
charged for the cost of the destruction”. He suggested the government was seeking a 
convenient diversion from growing public hostility towards Chinese and Portuguese workers 
in Angola: “The government needs to deflect attention. They are trying to find a scapegoat for 
economic pressures and saying Islam is not common to Angolan values and culture” (de 
Morais in Cabeshe and Smith, 2013). The Angolan government denies any attempt to ban 
Islam: “There is no war in Angola against Islam or any other religion”, says Manuel 
Fernando, director of religious affairs at the culture ministry (Manuel Fernando in Cabeshe 
and Smith, 2013). The key issue is again, although the facts related to these allegations are 
disputed, the way that the authorities have chosen to handle the situation, resulting in the use 
of violence against a minority group. The risk related to this indicator is rated as 2 – low, as 
these incidents can be seen as isolated events, and tot an overall trend.  
Ethnic conflict (1): Ethnic divisions played a role during the Angolan Civil War, as different 
ethnic groups sought to ally themselves with distinctive liberation groups. Ethnicity has as 
                                                        
24
 Ovimbundu 37%, Mbundu 25%, Bakongo 13%, Mestiços (mixed European and native African) 2%, 
European 1%, and 'Other' ethnic groups 22% (CIA World Factbook, 2014).  
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such played a role in Angolan politics and society during the years of the civil war; however, 
this has not translated into ethnic conflict in the post-civil war era. There is little to no 
empirical data suggesting any signs of an ongoing ethic conflict in Angola. The risk is hence 
rated as 1– nominal.  
Community opposition/social license to operate (4): The constitution of 2010 guarantees the 
right to freedom of assembly and peaceful demonstration. The Angolan law explicitly states 
that public demonstrations without government authorization are allowed. Nevertheless, 
according to reports by Human Rights Watch, the government has banned a number of anti-
government demonstrations in recent years and the police have obstructed the majority of 
peaceful demonstrations  (Human Rights Watch, 2013). Again, the norm in Angola seems to 
be that the laws are in place, but the enforcement of the laws is weak, and as such not 
protecting Angolan citizens’ rights as intended. Risk is evaluated as 4 – high.  
Standard of living (4): Despite remarkable oil riches, the majority of Angola’s population 
continues to live in extreme poverty and life expectancy is below the African average. 
Angola’s development indicators remain low, with high property levels and limited access to 
social services, and most Angolans find themselves living in great poverty. The UN Human 
Development Index ranks Angola as number 148 out of 186 countries, which puts Angola in 
the lowest category and as a country with “Low Human Development” (UN Human 
Development Index 2013). The Angolan authorities struggle to meet the basic needs of large 
sections of the population; furthermore, the Angolan population struggles with lack of 
economic opportunity, rapid urbanization and large numbers of youths without work or 
education, which again contributes to instability (KMPG, 2012-2013: 4). The root of this 
current situation is again linked to weak governance, as it is defecits in governance which 
limit economic opportunities and access to services for the Angolan people. There are long-
term risks related to this, as a grievance arguably has the potential to lead to violent conflict, 
hence the 4 – high-risk rating.  
Environmental activism (1): There is no notable environmental activism currently observed in 
Angola. However, according to the organization the Environmental Justice Atlas, there are a 
number of environmental issues experienced because of the extractive industry. The people 
living along the cost of Soyo and Cabinda are dependent on small-scale farming and fishing, 
but according to the Environmental Justice Atlas, their livelihoods are undermined by the 
extractive industry. The extractive industry’s technology pollutes, and events such as spills 
have dramatically decreased ecological productivity in the region. However, few people 
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understand scientifically how extractive activities impact on their health and the health of 
local ecosystems. According to the Environmental Justice Atlas, since there is little 
understanding of the risks or how to mitigate them, most resistance efforts focus on local 
people gaining compensation for losses or receiving a larger share in the distribution of 
benefits from resource extraction (Environmental Justice Atlas, 2014). With little awareness, 
there is also currently 1 – nominal risk of environmental activism. 
Final societal factor score: 9,22 out of a 17 percent weighed factor score of the overall risk 
model.  
4.2.4 Petroleum (host country political risk) 
In this section the petroleum factor is examined, which also relates to the host country 
political risk, as in the three preceding sub-sections. The following indicators are examined: 
ownership, domestic reserves/production, host’s relative market position, level and 
destination of exports, strength of national oil company (NOC), role of the foreign company 
in the national oil industry, oil and gas prices, domestic ability to operate the industry, and 
ownership/contractual relationship between the firm and the host country. 
Ownership (3): The state-owned oil company Sonangol controls the Angolan oil sector. 
Sonangol is at the moment a shareholder in most of the oil and gas exploration and production 
blocks in Angola. Sonangol owns 17 companies that operate throughout the extractive 
industries preforming tasks such as production and marketing of crude oil, exploration, 
storage and marketing of petroleum derivatives (EIA, 2014: 2). Sonangol is described as a 
professional international oil company; however, Sonangol’s ties to President dos Santos 
raises questions about transparency and corruption, which again poses 3 – medium risks to 
investors.  
Domestic Reserves/Production (2): According to the World Bank, known crude oil reserves 
will allow for at least another 21 years of exploitation in Angola (World Bank, 2013). Angola 
has about 9.1 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves. The majority of the proven reserves 
are located in the offshore parts of the Lower Congo and Kwanza basins. In the past couple of 
years Angola’s oil production has averaged around 1.8 million barrels a day, 1.7 of which are 
of crude oil. Angola’s production has been stagnant as a result of persistent technical issues, 
which has caused disruptions to supply in some fields. Rapid reservoir depletion has also 
resulted in steeply declining production rates at some oil fields. Angola has several oil 
projects planned to start production within the next five years and aims at increasing its 
production to 2.0 billion barrels a day by 2017 (EIA, 2014: 4). Because production continues 
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to grow, and there are vast amounts of proven reserves, there is a 2 – low risk of a stop in 
domestic production or the development of new fields.  
Host’s Relative Market Position (3): Sonangol administers and regulates the oil industry, and 
inhabits functions that traditionally would be under the purview of the Ministry of Finance, or 
the Central Bank, which can create a conflict of interest, according to Ramos (2012). 
Sonangol also has a monitoring role bypassing the Angolan Ministry of Petroleum and 
Environment. Sonangol’s organizational structure is described as porous, which according to 
Ramos (2012), increases the risk of corruption and dubious financial transactions. Sonangol 
inhabits an array of different roles; it is the concessionaire, equity partner and the operator in 
the industry. These three separate roles that Sonangol plays necessitates three budget 
transactions with the national Angolan budget: assets that Sonangol generates from equities in 
oil concession shares are largely reinvested in Sonangol and its subsidiaries; secondly, as a 
concessionaire, Sonangol signs the contracts and receives a share of the profits from the oil, 
which are transferred to the treasury; thirdly, Sonangol is commissioned with an array of 
quasi-fiscal activities that are funded from oil profits. As such Sonangol and consequently the 
president completely control the market, with little interference from other institutions such as 
the Ministry of Petroleum, Finance or any other institutions. The risk is evaluated as 3 – 
medium risk.  
Level and Destination of Exports (2): Angola has become the second-largest supplier of crude 
oil to China since 2005, behind Saudi Arabia. Other major destinations of Angolan oil include 
the US, the European Union and India. Nearly all of Angola’s oil production is exported, as 
Angola’s domestic refining capacity is limited. US imports of Angolan oil have, however, 
declined recently (EIA, 2014). The global demand for energy supplies is growing, and as such 
there is little risk tied to either lack of demand or an overall downturn in nations seeking to 
buy Angolan oil; hence the 2 – low risk related to this indicator. 
Strength of National Oil Company (4): The national oil company Sonangol is at the center of 
the Angolan oil industry. Second to the presidency, Sonangol is the most economically and 
politically important institution in Angola (Ramos, 2012: 23). By law MNCs that seek to do 
business in Angola must associate with Sonangol in the form of a Production Sharing 
Agreement (PSA) or a joint venture. In order to attain a contract, an MNC needs to pay 
signature bonuses, which can run up to billions of US dollars. Angolan law also obligates 
MNCs to contract Angolan companies for oil services, according to Ramos (2012), evidence 
points to the beneficial ownership and shareholdings in Angolan companies that have been 
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awarded contracts by Angola public officials, violating both international and Angolan law 
(Ramos, 2012: 1). Arguably the national oil company is too dominant, which has led to a low 
level of control given the company’s interaction and close relationship with the president and 
the MPLA; this is again related to the corruption indicator in section 4.2.1. The company’s 
dominance becomes both its strength and its biggest weakness at the same time. Risk is 
measured as 4 – high. 
Role of the Foreign Company in the National Oil Industry (3): The main contractual 
agreements used by Sonangol in its association with foreign companies are joint ventures and 
Production Sharing Agreements (PSA). Oil production in Angola is increasingly taking place 
in deep or ultra-deep water, which involves complex technology and particularly high 
development costs and risks. This means that small companies cannot participate without 
linking up with large MNCs,
25
 which again makes the MNCs indispensable to the Angolan oil 
industry, and again Sonangol is dependent on these companies. Ramos (2012) argues that this 
gives MNCs leverage and ability to influence government policies. Furthermore, the MNCs 
have market power and that technical capacity that potentially has the power to promote 
development (Ramos, 2012: 25). However, historically this has not been the case in the 
Angola oil industry, as multinational oil companies generally don’t address governance or 
transparency issues in Angola. There are some exceptions; BP and Statoil
26
 in particular have 
made efforts in terms of seeking a greater degree of transparency. Risk is assessed as 3 – 
medium. 
Oil and Gas Prices (4): As seen described in the previous three sub-sections, Angola is 
extremely dependent on the revenues from its oil exports, as they accounts for more than 46 
percent of Angola’s GDP and 96 percent of its exports (World Bank, 2013: 1). Thus 
international oil prices matter deeply in Angola. This is in large part a consequence of the lack 
of diversification in the Angolan economy. As seen in relation to the 2008 global financial 
crisis, Angola’s oil revenues and GDP dropped dramatically as a result of a decline in global 
oil prices and a slowdown in domestic oil production. This also strongly impacted on the 
                                                        
25 International oil companies currently operating in Angola: Chevron (US), ExxonMobil (US), BP 
(UK), Total (France), Petrobras (Brazil), Cobalt (US), Tullow (UK), Vaalco (US), Pluspetrol 
(Argentina), Maersk Oil (Denmark), Eni (Italy); and those awarded licenses to operate in the most 
recent pre-salt and deep-sea concessions: Statoil (Norway) and Repsol (Spain). Beyond these, a 
number of other foreign oil companies are partners in oil blocks, including Galp (Portugal), SSi 
(China), Marathon (US), Falcon Oil (US), Prodoil (Norway), Ajoco (Japan), Svenksa (Sweden), 
Tenenge (Brazil) and Partex Oil & Gas (Portugal). 
26
 See section 4.2.5. Company Political Risk for a more in-depth examination of Statoil’s transparency 
efforts.  
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Angolan economy as a whole, through weakened consumption, cuts in public spending and 
the increase of substantial arrears to domestic firms (World Bank, 2013: 1). The government 
has made efforts to diversify the economy, as well as establishing a sovereign wealth fund in 
order to prevent a drop in prices hitting the economy as hard as it has in the past; however, 
Angola is still heavily dependent on oil prices and would be adversely effected in the case of 
a dramatic drop in price level. Risk is evaluated as 4 – high.  
Domestic Ability to Operate the Industry (3): As noted under the Role of the Foreign 
Company indicator, Angola and Sonangol are dependent on joint ventures and PSA 
agreements with multinational oil companies in order to secure proper technology and funds 
to develop and manage the deep and ultra-deep oil fields. In relation to no-technical issues, 
Angola’s ability to operate the extractive industries is constantly questioned. The poor quality 
of Angola’s institutions of redistribution is arguably the main source for the oil boom being 
describes by many as a “curse”, as these institutions are designed to be “grabber friendly” 
(Amundsen, 2014: 173). Furthermore, extraction methods arguably used by Angolan state 
elites have led to “missing billions” from oil contracts and signature bonuses, or reports by 
the authorities to the IMF that large inconsistencies and millions unaccounted for are the 
norm, clearly puts Angola’s ability to handle or operate the industry into question. But 
Sonangol is also praised by most Western banks, as well as most oil companies. Sonangol has 
become a sophisticated and modern oil company. MNCs speak well of Sonangol, reporting 
“hassle-free interactions with the company”; from this perspective Sonangol fills the 
requirements of competence, predictability and a measure of mutual trust (de Oliveira, 2007: 
605). Angola’s ability to operate the industry is twofold; in some aspects they are perfectly 
capable, while in regards to others Sonangol completely misses the mark, hence a rating of 3.  
Ownership/Contractual relationship between the Firm and the Host Country (2): According 
to KPMG’s Angola report, there is little risk of the Angolan government directly 
expropriating the assets of foreign investors. In terms of the contractual relationship between 
the authorities and the multinational oil companies, these are either in the form of a PSA 
agreement or a joint venture. As noted in section 4.2.2 under Unclear Legislation/Security of 
Tenure enforcing contracts, if there is a dispute, the matter can become challenging. Risk is 2 
– low. 
Final rating petroleum factor score: 9 out of a 15 percent weighed factor score of the overall 
risk model.  
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4.2.5 Company Political Risk (Company political risk) 
This sub-section examines the political risk tied to the company, which in this case is the 
Norwegian oil company Statoil. The following indicators are examined: nationality of the 
company, world industry positioning, special bargaining advantage, and host government 
relations.  
Nationality of the Company (1): Statoil is the Norwegian national oil company, and as such 
classified as a NOC. Statoil is positioning itself internationally along the lines of a new 
growing trend, as described by Al-Kasim, Søreide and Williams (2008), where NOCs now are 
challenging the traditional IOCs in the global competition for oil reserves (2008: 18). Statoil 
is strongly based on the Norwegian heritage, its ethics, as well as playing a leading role in 
promoting increased transparency in the oil industry. Statoil’s commitment to transparency is 
displayed in Transparency International’s 2012 business ranking on transparency, which 
measured the 105 biggest public companies. This report ranked Statoil as number one 
transparent company with a score of 8.3. Transparency International describes Statoil as a 
company that “discloses significant information about its anti-corruption programs, 
subsidiaries, taxes and profits across its 36 countries of operations” (Transparency 
International 2012).  Neither the nationality of the company nor the company itself poses any 
risk and as such the risk is rated as 1 – nominal.  
World Industry Positioning (2): Statoil has gown immensely since it was founded in 1972 
when Norway discovered its oil, and now has operations in 36 countries worldwide. Statoil 
expects its production and development internationally to account for a large share of its total 
production in the future (Statoil, 2013: 25). Angola is the company’s most important 
investment on the African continent and the biggest contributor to Statoil’s production outside 
Norway (Statoil, 2013). Statoil’s main development projects are in Angola, Canada, 
Azerbaijan, the UK and the US, Statoil’s petroleum production outside Norway amounted to 
an average of 470,000 barrels of oil equivalent (boe) per day of entitlement production and 
669 000 boe per day of equity production (Statoil, 2012). Statoil’s total proved oil and gas 
reserves were estimated to be 5 600 mmboe at year-end 2013, compared to 5 422 mmboe at 
the end of 2012 (Statoil, 2013). Statoil is increasingly becoming a key player internationally, 
and as an international company Statoil experienced on 16 January 2013 what risks this can 
entail. Statoil, BP and Sonatrach were hit by a terrorist attack in the Amenas production 
facility in Algeria, causing the death of 40 workers, five of which were Statoil employees. 
The terrorist attack clearly illustrates how no company is immune to political risk. The 
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incident cannot be seen as a direct consequence of Statoil’s position or solely as an attack on 
Statoil itself, as there were many underlying causes leading up to the attack, which will not be 
discussed here. Risk is assessed as 2 – low.  
Special Bargaining Advantage (3): Most of the Angolan oil resources are located in deep or 
ultra-deep waters, which is one of Statoil’s strongest fields of expertise. Furthermore, Statoil’s 
technology is key for Angola, both in the pre-salt field where Statoil is now operator, as well 
as in the deep and ultra-deep oil fields. Statoil has also spent large sums on different CSR and 
development projects in Angola. In 2013 Statoil invested 121 billion Norwegian Kroner  
(NOK) in contractual social investments, which is required by partners in a PSA agreement. 
Statoil however spent 5 billion NOK in voluntary social investments, including a program 
that promotes higher education in petroleum sciences (Statoil, 2013: 20). Such initiatives 
make Statoil a strategic partner for the Angolan government, as the numbers in their annual 
report show that Statoil invests more in non-oil related development than what is required of 
them. As an operator at blocks 38 and 39, Statoil is clearly heavily invested in Angola, with a 
high level of sunken assets. This can play both in favor of and against Statoil, as a big 
investor has leverage, but if there were any big changes in the Angolan government’s policies 
as a result of a change in government, risks might increase. As such short- to mid-term risks 
are low, though this has the potential to change, putting Statoil’s investment at risk long-term. 
Risk is rated as 3 – medium.  
Host Government Relations (3): Statoil’s production in Angola exceeds more than 200 000 
barrels a day, which is more than any other of Statoil’s production outside Norway. Statoil’s 
portfolio in Angola currently consists of seven offshore blocks.
27
 Among the major oil 
companies Statoil has a lead in promoting transparency. Statoil uses the disclosure exemption 
provision in its PSA with Sonangol, whereby Sonangol will authorize foreign operators to 
publish such information if mandated by home country laws (Ramos, 2012: 25). By 
publishing the amount of signature bonuses paid, Statoil to some extent pushes the Angolan 
authorities to a greater degree of transparency in their dealings. According to numbers 
published by Statoil in 2013, the company paid 1.4 billion NOK in signature bonuses
28
 to the 
Angolan authorities (Statoil, 2013: 20). Statoil is currently in a disagreement with the 
                                                        
27
 Block 17-23, 33%, Block 15-13, 33%, Block 31-13, 33%, and Block 4/5-20%. Statoil operated pre-
salt assets: Block 38 – 55%, Block 39 – 55%. Statoil PSA agreements with 20%: Blocks 22, 25 and 
40.  
28 Angolan petroleum law requires that a part of the signature bonus paid to the Angolan state be 
earmarked for social purposes; however, there is little information of how the funds are used and 
Sonangol has the final say in how the funds are spent (Ramos, 2012: 26).  
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Angolan Ministry of Finance, which has calculated additional profit oil and taxes for Statoil 
on the basis of activities that currently include the years 2002 up to 2010. However, Statoil 
disputes the calculations and is pursuing these matters in accordance with the relevant 
Angolan legal and administrative procedures. On the basis of the assessments and continued 
activity on the four blocks up to and including 2013, the exposure for Statoil at year end 2013 
is estimated at US$ 0.9 billion (NOK 5.5 billion), the most significant part of which relates to 
profit oil elements. Overall the relationship is good, with no particular short- to mid-term 
risks related to it, hence a rating of 3 is given.  
Final rating for the company factor score: 3.6 out of an 8 percent weighed factor score of the 
overall risk model.  
4.2.6 International Political Risk (International political risk) 
In this sub-section international political risk is examined through the following indicators: 
host government international integration, host/home government relations, world petroleum 
market, world economic condition, the demonstration effect.  
Host Government International Integration (3): In the years after independence, Angola had 
close relations to the Soviet Union.  However, Angola has been determined to avoid repeating 
its Cold War proxy past. Consequently, the government skillfully maintains diversified 
diplomatic and financial partners. Despite China’s massive loans for Angola’s post-war 
reconstruction, the government has also arranged important oil-backed credit lines with 
Portugal, Brazil, Germany and the US. Moreover, Angola restored relations with the IMF 
during the 2009 crisis, enabling a Stand-by Agreement loan facility (SBA), while avoiding 
overreliance on Chinese financing and opening the door for improvements in the detrimental 
business climate. In the coming years Angola’s key foreign policy aims will be to diversify 
access to international finance, to expand the county’s regional and international influence, 
and to consolidate relations with key strategic partners – in particular, China, Brazil and 
Portugal (KPMG, 2012-2013:37). Relations with the DRC will remain tense, owing to 
expulsions of illegal immigrants by both countries and a quarrel over the delineation of the 
maritime border in oil-rich waters. However, the risk of an escalation is small, as the DRC 
will be careful to avoid an escalation into an armed conflict, given Angola’s superior military 
strength. Angola’s relationship with China, which is based on oil-backed Chinese loans and 
credit lines, continues to deepen. Warm relations with Portugal will continue, with that 
country’s financially strapped government keen to attract Angolan investment (KPMG, 2012-
2013:37). Angola is well integrated internationally and no particular risks are identified in 
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relation to this indicator, hence a rating of 3 is awarded.  
Host-Home Government Relations (2): Angola is the most important Africa country to 
Norway, in large part due to Norway’s national oil company Statoil’s substantial investments 
in the country. Furthermore, numerous other Norwegian companies are tied to Statoil’s oil 
operations in Angola as well to the Angolan oil industry in general. In the March 2014 edition 
of the Sonangol Universo magazine the relationship between Angola and Norway is described 
as follows: “Angola-Norway a perfect partnership” (Sonangol-Universo, 2014: 7). Norway 
celebrates 37 years of diplomatic relationship with Angola in 2014, and oil is by far Norway’s 
largest area of cooperation with Angola. According to Sonangol, Statoil has much closer links 
with Sonangol than most other oil companies, largely because of Statoil’s contributions to 
developing Sonangol’s operational company, Sonangol P&P. Outside the petroleum industry, 
two of the biggest NGOs present in Angola are Norwegian: Norwegian People’s Aid and 
Norwegian Church Aid; both NGOs are doing important work such as clearing land mines, 
building organizational capacity in local and civil society, and providing water and sanitation 
to less urbanized areas. However, Norwegian aid to Angola has historically been very low 
(Sonangol-Universo, 2014: 13). Norway and Angola’s relationship is extending far beyond 
oil, but this is and will probably continue to be the cornerstone of this mutually beneficial 
relationship. Statoil and consequently Norway are deeply invested in Angola, economically 
but also politically, by seeking to promote a larger degree of transparency in relation to oil 
revenues and signature bonuses. However, Statoil and consequently Norway are not using 
their leverage to promote good governance in Angola, nor seeking to make demands related 
to political issues a part of their business. Statoil merely sets out to follow the laws of the 
country it operates in. A rating of 2 – low is given.  
World Petroleum Market (3): The oil market prices hit an extreme low during the global 
financial crisis in 2008-2009. In more recent years West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil 
prices have been closer to 100 dollars per barrel
29
 (EIA, 2014b). In the case of Angola, a 
country heavily dependent on oil prices, the fluctuation in oil prices greatly affects the 
economy. EIA estimates that non-OPEC liquids production grew by 1.4 million bbl/d in 2013, 
averaging 54.1 million bbl/d for the year. EIA expects non-OPEC liquids production to grow 
by 1.7 million bbl/d in 2014 and 1.0 million bbl/d in 2015. EIA estimates that OPEC crude oil 
production averaged 29.9 million bbl/d in 2013, a decline of 1.0 million bbl/d from the 
                                                        
29
 WTI Crude oil prices per barrel; 2012-94.12 $, 2013-97.91 $, 2014-100.98 $, and the prospect for 
2015 is 95.17 $ (EIA, 2014b).  
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previous year, primarily reflecting increased outages in Libya, Nigeria and Iraq, along with 
strong non-OPEC supply growth. EIA expects OPEC crude oil production to fall by 0.3 
million bbl/d in 2014 and by an additional 0.1 million bbl/d in 2015 to accommodate growing 
production in non-OPEC countries. According to this EIA Report the inclusion of detailed 
2015 oil demand forecasts, with total global oil deliveries for the year predicted as rising by 
1.4 mb/d (or 1.5%) on the year to 94.1 mb/d. Newly industrialized and emerging market 
economies are once again forecast to lead the gains, rising by approximately 1.5 mb/d to 48.2 
mb/d, while OECD demand is forecast to decline by around 0.1 mb/d, to 45.9 mb/d. (EIA, 
2014c). EIA expects global consumption to grow by 1.1 million bbl/d in 2014 and 1.5 million 
bbl/d in 2015. Non-OECD countries account for nearly all of the expected consumption 
growth in 2014 and 2015. Predictions show an overall steady growth, and as such the risk is 
assessed as 3 – medium in the short-term.  
World Economic Condition (3): According to the IMF World Economic Outlook report, 
global economic activity has broadly strengthened and is expected to improve further in 2014-
2015, with much of the push coming from advanced economies (IMF, 2014). The IMF 
outlines three main concerns: emerging market risks have increased; there are risks to 
activities from lower-than-expected inflation in advanced economies; and geopolitical risks 
have resurfaced. Generally, the balance of risks, while improved, remains a weakness. The 
renewed increase in financial volatility in late January of this year highlights the challenges 
for emerging market economies posed by the changing external environment (IMF, 2014). 
The proximate cause seems to have been renewed market concern about emerging market 
fundamentals. In advanced economies growth is expected to increase to about 21⁄4 percent in 
2014–15, an improvement of about 1 percentage point compared with 2013 (IMF, 2014: XV). 
In terms of current and projected growth in energy consumption, EIA expects global 
consumption to grow by 1.1 million bbl/d in 2014 and 1.5 million bbl/d in 2015, and in 2014 
EIA projects that world energy consumption will increase by 56 percent (EIA, 2013). The key 
overall trend is continued growth; as such risk is assed as 3 – medium.  
The Demonstration Effect (2): One of the key trends in the oil and gas industry is the NOCs 
gaining power over the international oil market. NOCs are now a great competitor to the 
traditional IOCs, and this is changing the playing field. According to a 2013 Deloitte report, 
the global expansion of NOCs and implications to their IOC peers are more nuanced than the 
overriding notion that NOCs are taking larger risks by buying underdeveloped acreage and 
fields, and initiating large purchases in emerging markets. This illustrates that NOCs are 
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taking a long view and globally expanding for local resource development and technical 
capacity building (Deloitte, 2013: 18). NOCs’ global procurement and expansion has 
primarily focused on oil over gas because of higher demand for oil and its premium price 
advantage. In terms of demand, NOCs’ immediate priority is to secure oil supplies, as their 
economies are heavily oil-dependent for both exports and imports (Deloitte, 2013: 18). The 
global expansion of NOCs is not a new phenomenon, but the fact that expansion strategies 
differ between oil and gas is a recent and important development. NOCs have evolved from 
players focused on production in domestic oil resources to become interested in more 
complex and unconventional oil extraction. The NOCs from energy-hungry, developing 
countries, such as China and Brazil, are also transitioning from being passive partners of 
IOCs seeking supply security, and are becoming technical leaders in riskier plays (Deloitte, 
2013: 18). Sonangol is also playing its part in this trend, as the company’s reach 
internationally is growing. Sonangol maintains Sonangol Limited (for UK markets), Sonangol 
USA Company (for US markets), and China Sonangol. Sonangol has operations, exploration 
ventures and equity in oil projects in Cape Verde, Congo-Brazzaville, São Tomé and 
Príncipe, Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela and the Gulf of Mexico. However, the company withdrew 
from Iraq last December and recently announced withdrawal from Iran because of 
international sanctions (Ramos, 2012: 24).  This also demonstrates how non-Western oil 
companies, and the NOCs from emerging markets in particular are seeking the mutual 
benefits of cooperation, and are increasingly becoming more dominant within the extractive 
industry. Angola and Sonangol are as illustrated here, clearly a part of this growing trend. The 
indicator is rated 2 – low risk.  
Final rating for the international political risk factor score: 7.8 out of a 15 percent weighed 
factor score of the overall risk model.  
 
4.3 Risk report and key tends 
The result from the political risk analysis as shown in Table 9 establishes that the overall 
score for the analysis is 57,97. As illustrated in Table 8, a rating between 51-60 indicates 
medium  – relatively moderate risk. 
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Table 9. Risk Report 
 
Factor              Indicators                                                                              Rating       Score 
 
Political 
(25%) 
Regime/political stability     4      17,5 
War and security issues     2 
Repatriation restrictions     3 
Corruption/poor governance     4 
Unclear legislation/security of tenure     4  
Investment constraints     4 
 
Economic 
(20%) 
Economic performance      2     10,85 
Balance of payments     2 
Creditworthiness     3 
Currency convertibility     3 
Energy vulnerability     4 
Public/private sector mix     3 
Current account deficit     2 
 
Societal 
(17%) 
 
Internal violence     4      9,22 
Civil and labor unrest     3 
Homogeneity      2 
Ethnic conflict      1 
Community opposition/social license to operate     4 
Standard of living      4 
Environmental activism     1 
 
Petroleum 
(15 %) 
Ownership     3      9,0 
Domestic reserves/production     2 
Host´s relative market position      3 
Level and destination of exports     4 
Strength of national oil company      2 
Role of foreign Company in the national oil industry     4 
Oil and gas prices     4 
Domestic ability to operate the industry     3 
Ownership/contractual relationship between firm and 
host country 
    2 
Company 
(8%) 
Nationality of the company     1       3,6 
World industry positioning     2 
Special bargaining advantage     3 
Host government relations     3 
 
International 
(15%) 
Host government international integration     3       7,8 
Host/home government relations     2 
World petroleum market     3 
World economic condition     3 
The demonstration effect     2 
   Total   57,97 
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This risk analysis has made the following key findings. The indicators with the highest risk 
ratings indicate the areas in Angola that investors in general should be aware of. In relation to 
the political indicators, elections and a possible change in presidency are the two that stand 
out. These are again linked with the social factor and the currently simmering social tensions. 
A distinction should be made between short- to mid-term risks and potential long-term risks, 
particularly in terms of the social and political factors. In the short term Angola seems to be, 
and will continue to be, stable politically, economically and socially as well as in relation to 
petroleum. However, in the run-up to the 2016 elections, or in relation to the succession plans 
of President dos Santos and the positioning of his deputy Manual Vicente, tension are likely 
to rise during this current presidential term. The fact that Angolan youths as well as civil 
society in general are starting to speak out against the regime to a much higher degree than 
ever before, demanding change, as the inequality in the country grows and the oil elite get 
richer, will at some point probably turn into a high level of conflict. Social conflict is a risk 
factor that could pose huge risks to international oil companies, such as in the 2013 Amenas 
terrorist attacks mentioned above. As a major player in Angola, the oil industry is a prime 
target. The recent threat of political derailment has diminished, yet challenges will emerge 
from presidential succession plans and increased empowerment of civil society and 
opposition groups, and companies should take note of potential long-term risks in relation to 
this situation.  In terms of the economic and petroleum factors, Angola’s extreme dependency 
on the oil export revenues and its vulnerability to changing international oil prices still pose a 
high level of risk. Angola’s growth outlook, though optimistic, still has the potential of being 
affected by oil price fluctuations and as well as the risk of prolonged global economic 
downturn. Prognoses for world economic growth are, however, positive at this point in time. 
The medium-term scenario projects record highs in terms of growth supported by oil prices, 
which are likely to remain high in the coming years, while being increasingly pushed by large 
public investments in non-oil sectors. The poor infrastructure and difficult business climate 
will limit the development of both the private and non-oil sector. Nevertheless, thanks to solid 
oil revenues, Angola’s external accounts are solid with strong financial fundamentals, a stable 
liquidity position and a surplus, though declining, on the current account. The main short-
term risk in Angola’s outlook results from the uncertain global environment, given Angola’s 
fiscal strength, and despite the positive developments in fiscal management, Angola is still 
vulnerable to any sustained negative oil price shock. 
 Pervasive corruption and a lack of transparency in relation to oil revenues continue 
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despite Statoil’s effort to publish and report all their dealings with Angola. Statoil has a strict 
zero tolerance when it comes to corruption, but any company operating in a high-risk 
corruption environment is ultimately exposed to such risks. 
 There are no particular company-specific risks facing Statoil’s operations in Angola. 
Statoil has a good relationship with Sonangol as well as the authorities. Statoil and Norway 
are deeply invested in multiple areas of the Angolan oil industry and society, and all parties 
are reaping the benefits of what clearly is a mutually beneficial relationship. Though Statoil is 
promoting a higher degree of transparency, it is not using its arguable leverage in order to 
question the lack of democracy, human rights violations, or the way the authorities are 
spending the infamous signature bonuses. In terms of long-term risks, Statoil has a high level 
of sunken costs in the country, as oil companies do, and if the political or social situation 
related to social unrest changes, the company’s high level of tied up investments could 
potentially be at risk. It is important to note that this risk analysis is done based on an already 
existing investor, Statoil. The risks for a new, smaller investor that does not have the close 
ties to the extractive industries in the country, or the resources, may be very different than 
those facing Statoil’s operations in Angola.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The objectives of this chapter were firstly to present the industry specific risk model; and 
secondly, to apply the industry-specific risk model to the case of Angola through the 
evaluation of six factors and the 38 subsequent indicators. Each indicator was assigned an 
individual score, based on the data presented, resulting in an overall factor score. By adding 
all the factor scores together a final OPRR score was arrived at that indicates the current 
overall company-specific political risk that faces Statoil in Angola. In the next chapter the 
research questions will be answered and the final finding of this study will be presented.  
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Chapter five: Main findings and analysis 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Emerging markets are increasingly driving the world’s economic growth, and a growing part 
of the world’s energy supply comes from politically unstable or undemocratic countries with 
less developed institutions and inadequate rule of law. In order to keep up with international 
and domestic demand, and maintain profit levels, there has been and will continue to be a 
search for new sources of petroleum reserves. This has pushed the extractive industries to 
invest in new territories, some of which pose potential risks for new investments. These 
trends are changing where and how oil and gas companies are going about their business, as 
many of the political risks that face the extractive industries stem from the political, 
institutional and structural framework of the host country. Globalization is a key driving force 
behind the increasing number of investments in unstable, undemocratic and corrupt countries.  
The main research question of this study, examines whether high levels of democracy 
constitute low levels of political risk. The aim of the research has been to answer this question 
by conducting a political risk analysis of Statoil in Angola using an industry-specific political 
risk model developed by Boshoff and Lambrachts (2011). By establishing the level of 
democracy, and subsequently conducting a risk analysis of a company operating within that 
given context, the extent to which the level of democracy will affect the overall political risk 
that the particular company is faced with is gauged. This is what was measured through the 
political risk analysis. The second sub-question directly pursues this further by examining the 
level of political risk that Statoil faces as a company operating in the oil and gas industry in 
Angola. The first sub-question concerned the current level of democracy in Angola, using the 
Freedom House approach, which was assessed in Chapter Three.  
The following sections aim to answer the research questions, present the key findings 
of the research, as well as address the debate around the assumption that high levels of 
democracy constitute low levels of political risk, and subsequently that low levels of 
democracy are associated with high risk. Recommendations for further research will also be 
made.  
5.2 Progress of the study 
Chapter one laid out the premises of this study. A brief preliminary literature review was 
provided. The research question was presented together with two sub-questions that were 
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identified as crucial to conduct the research study. The rationale of the research also 
addressed the relevance and validation of the study. The research design and methodology 
were outlined, followed by the limitations and delimitations of the study. 
 Chapter Two had three main objectives. The political risk literature was reviewed, key 
political risk terms were conceptualized, establishing the theoretical framework that served as 
the foundation for the research, and the concept of democracy examined, as well as the 
relationship between FDI, democracies and democratic institutions.  
 Chapter Three addressed three main elements related to the contextualization of the 
case. Firstly, the situation in Angola was contextualized, both in relation to democracy and 
the extractive industry. Secondly, the Norwegian oil company Statoil and its operations in 
Angola were examined. Thirdly, the chapter examined issues related to the measurement of 
democracy, looking especially at the Freedom House approach. This was done in order to 
determine the present level of democracy in Angola, subsequently answering the first of the 
two sub-research questions of the study. 
 In Chapter Four the risk model, as well as the pertaining methodology was presented. 
Secondly, an assessment and presentation of the risk factors and indicators was conducted in 
order to arrive at the overall political risk rating. This produced the findings that will be 
presented in the subsequent sub-sections of this chapter.  
5.3 Discussing and answering the research questions 
The main research question of the study was: Do high levels of democracy constitute low 
levels of political risk for oil and gas companies? The reasoning behind examining this 
question is the changing investment climate facing companies operating in extractive 
industries as a result of the search for new petroleum reserves. In emerging markets, which 
are not necessarily democratic, as in the case of Angola, companies face different conditions 
than those in a democracy. Arguably as a result of this, they face different types of political 
risks to those they would face in traditional democracies. The assumption that high levels of 
democracy constitute low levels of political risk implies, conversely, that low levels of 
democracy constitute high levels of political risk. The debate around this assumption is the 
core of this research study, and the political risk analysis done in this study sets out to test this 
proposition.  
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There is a widely accepted perception among scholars that democratic institutions 
attract FDI, and that investing in emerging markets requires “soft infrastructure”. 30 
Democracies attract MNCs and FDI because of lower investment risks and a more secure 
investment climate, it is claimed. However, the empirical data and trends described in this 
study illustrate that MNCs and oil companies are to a greater extent choosing to invest in 
undemocratic nations, despite assumed levels of increased risks. Arguably the time has come 
to challenge the above assumptions, as our globalized economy is pushing MNCs, oil 
companies in particular, to invest in new territories, despite increased risk levels.  
Olson’s (1993) “rational long-term autocratic leader” 31  argument is useful when 
analyzing the Angolan case. President dos Santos’s regime arguably follows the logic of 
Olson’s argument. The Angolan economy will only generate the maximum income if there is 
a high rate of investment; the returns, however, are divided in two: signature bonuses paid 
before said investment is made, while the majority of the revenues are received a long time 
after the investment is made. According to this logic, it is in the best interest of President dos 
Santos to provide a secure investment climate in order to maximize Angola’s – and as such 
his own – returns. As established in Chapter Four, the political risk is not as high as one 
would assume according to the assumption that low levels of democracy constitute high levels 
of risk. As indicated in Chapter Two, autocratic regimes that are seemingly stable may hide 
underlying instability that ultimately causes sudden and unpredictable change. This argument 
coincides with one of the key findings of the political risk analysis, namely that short- to mid-
term risks are assessed as low; however, there are trends particularly related to political and 
social factors that hold a great potential of long-term political risks. Yet it is in the interest of 
the authorities in an undemocratic country to secure a stable and good investment climate, as 
seen in Angola. When examining the underlying motives for such efforts, it seems that they 
can vary greatly from those of a fully-fledged democracy, or autocracies implementing some 
democratic principles are simply seeking the highest possible profits. The findings of this 
research illustrate support for the argument that an undemocratic country does not always 
constitute high levels of political risk, as assumed in the literature. Though, as this research 
study suggests, there are simply are too many global factors that one has to take into 
consideration; thus based on the findings of this study one cannot make the assumption that 
democracy equals low levels of political risk or vice versa. It is rather the interplay between a 
                                                        
30
 See section 2.4.1, in Chapter Two for the debate on the relationship and link between democracy, 
autocracy, MNCs, FDI and political risk. 
31
 Olson’s “rational long-term autocratic leader” argument is presented in section 2.4.1, Chapter Two.  
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number of factors and indicators. The world is constantly changing and as such our old 
perception of ‘democracy good, autocracy bad’ may be in the process of becoming dated, as 
far as investment is concerned. 
The first sub-question examined the current level of democracy present in Angola. 
This was addressed in Chapter Three, which concluded that Angola has the rating of Not free. 
This implies that Angola is undemocratic, according to the conceptualization of electoral 
democracy that was adopted in this study, which is a thicker understanding of the concept. 
Hence democracy is more than a constitutional democracy with elections and a multiparty 
system. True freedom has to be achieved through democratic institutions in order for a 
country to be classified as a democracy; this has not yet been achieved in Angola.  
The second sub-question was: What is the level of political risk that Statoil faces 
operating in the oil and gas industry in Angola? The aim was to answer this question by 
conducting a political risk analysis of Angola, using an industry-specific risk model. By 
testing for risk in an undemocratic country measures the level of risk a company faces. The 
political risk analysis shows that the political risks that face Statoil in the undemocratic nation 
of Angola are in fact not high. The analysis concludes with a result of 57.97, which indicates 
that investment in Angola poses a medium level of political risk. This speaks in support of 
challenging the above assumption, as the political risks are not necessarily higher in an 
undemocratic country. As noted in Chapter One, one can assume that the results found for 
Statoil in Angola can be translated into a general risk assessment for the oil and gas industry 
in Angola, as there are no particularities that would suggest that Statoil’s operations in 
themselves would entail a higher degree of company risk than the general mainstream oil 
company.  
5.3 Evaluation and key findings  
The main finding of this research study relates to the main and the second sub-research 
question, and as described in the previous section, the overall political risk that faces Statoil 
and arguably the industry in general is medium – hence not high as one would have assumed 
based on the theoretical framework presented in Chapter Two. The key political risks that 
have been identified show how interconnected political risks in fact are, and one cannot 
isolate a single factor or indicator. This is also the reasoning behind doing an overall political 
risk rating of the Angolan case and not doing a single factor rating. The key findings of this 
research illustrate this interplay between the factors, particularly when looking at the political 
and social factors. As concluded in Chapter Four section 4.3, tensions are likely to rise during 
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this current presidential term. This, coupled with the growing social tensions, has the potential 
of turning into a violent conflict, which is accordingly seen as a long-term risk factor for oil 
companies operating within this context. The study also found a strong interplay between the 
economic, petroleum and international factors. Angola’s extreme economic dependency on 
the oil export revenues, and its vulnerability to changing international oil prices, still pose a 
high-level long-term political risk. Another potential risk that has been identified, which 
arguably runs through all of the six factors, is the element of pervasive corruption; as 
institutionalized as corruption still is in Angola, it becomes aspect of any of the six factors. As 
such any company operating in a high-risk corruption environment is ultimately exposed to 
such risks.  
Another key finding is that one needs differentiate between long-term and short- to 
medium-term risk when conduction a political risk analysis of the Angolan case. Some 
indicators, particularly the political and social, have a great potential for being long-term 
political risks. Furthermore, the interplay between the economic, petroleum and international 
variables, where Angola’s strong dependency of oil export revenues and consequently 
international oil prices, pose long-term risks, but this is not necessarily the case when 
assessing short- to mid-term risks.  
 A growing trend described in this study is that NOCs are increasingly taking control of 
the market and becoming more powerful players within the extractive industries. The 
relationship between Statoil and Sonangol is testimony to this very fact, illustrating the 
successful collaboration of two NOCs. However, an issue that has arisen as a consequence of 
this is the moral dilemma for Statoil, as the company is frequently criticized in its home 
country of Norway for investing large sums in countries with regimes that have little or no 
respect for human rights or democracy. As an NOC Statoil represents Norway, an epitome of 
a democratic state, in its transactions globally and as a consequence this dilemma arises when 
Statoil invests in undemocratic and corrupt countries. Arguably as a consequence of a 
globalized world, and the constant competition for new sources of oil and gas, these things are 
no longer as clear cut. As seen in the Angolan case, a relatively good investment climate can 
be provided with an authoritarian leader, hence the challenge to Western notions of 
democracy being the only feasible regime option for investment. Many factors come into play 
in such a debate, particularly in the Angolan case. On the one hand, there are massive oil 
riches and a small elite that is rapidly becoming richer, and on the other hand, there are one of 
the world’s lowest human development ratings and highest corruption rates. Thus the issues 
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concerning an oil company’s moral obligations should as such still be raised, but can one 
demand more of a company than that they follow the international and host and home country 
laws?  
 
5.4 Critique and suggestions for further research 
This study builds upon the research study conducted by Boshoff (2010) and Boshoff and 
Lambrechts (2011). It has tested the model developed by conducting a risk analysis by using 
their complete model, with knowledge of the investor. Thus both the full potential of the 
model has been tested, as well as the reliability and validity of the original model and 
research. 
 With further research in mind, conducting a comparative study, a political risk 
analysis using the complete model, in a most similar or most different design, would provide 
additional insight into the validity and reliability of the model, and expand on the findings of 
this study. Using a similar case in future research, such as Nigeria or Uganda, with many 
similar traits as the Angolan case, would be advantageous in terms of further testing of the 
assumption about democracy and risk. A most different design could include research on 
South Africa, where the level of democracy is assumed to be higher. Such a study could 
contribute towards confirming the findings of this research study. In conducting research 
using the same political risk model, the researcher must be aware of the vast amount of data 
collection necessary, when using both phase one and two of the model. It is almost impossible 
to gather all the relevant information when undertaking a political risk analysis, or to get to 
know all the unknowns. For future research, finding a company that has yet to invest but is 
still planning to could potentially enhance the value of the study, as one is able to actually aid 
a company in its investment decision. Finding a company that has not invested yet but 
contemplating doing so would be beneficial, as there is no existing relationship with the host 
country. In this study the chosen company was already present and operating in Angola. This 
allows the researcher to examine the current and past relationship of the investor and host 
country, which can give useful insight into potential company risks.  
The information that was used to analyze the indicators in the case of Angola was all 
retrieved from secondary sources. The study could have benefited from primary data from 
both the political risk industry itself as well as the extraction industry could have enhanced 
the knowledge regarding real-world development and the application of political risk models. 
Such first-hand information could be obtained by conducting interviews or by conducting 
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longer-term field research. Furthermore, access to existing measurement tools of political risk 
that face oil and gas companies today could allow for valuable insight into and comparison of 
the indicators. Deeper understanding of the relationship these industries have with one 
another and the benefits that political risk analysis brings to the oil and gas industry, and the 
greater extraction industry. 
 
5.5 Conclusion  
In this research study the assumption that democracy constitutes low levels of political risk 
has been tested through conducting an industry- and company-specific political risk analysis 
of Statoil’s operations in Angola. The core of the study has been the debate on the assumption 
that high levels of democracy equal low levels of political risk, and consequently that low 
levels of democracy equals high risk. The findings of this study, however, question these 
assumptions, suggesting that in the case of Angola specifically low levels of democracy do 
not translate into high levels of political risk.       
 This study can be seen as a contribution to the field of political risk as it is an industry- 
and company-specific political risk analysis, and as such contributes to a segment of the field 
which is still in its infancy. Political risk can be understood as the connection between 
business and politics; hence knowledge of this connection assists in understanding the 
political risks involved in making business decisions. Consequently, an industry-specific 
political risk analysis adds value to the study of political risk in general.    
 With constant and unforeseen changes in an ever more tightly interconnected world, 
the field of political risk has never mattered more.  
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Complete political risk model (Boshoff and Lambrechts, 2011: 4).  
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Map 1. Statoil´s current operations in Angola (Statoil, 2014). 
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